quinta-feira, 29 de abril de 2010

Whispering of the Gods #5


"This is the first time I have said this: for me, to make a film is not to show or to convince someone of something. I make films because I want to know something specific, which means that it changes from film to film. So when I have shot one picture I see no reason to look back at it again." - Susumu Hani (read full interview)

quarta-feira, 28 de abril de 2010

Shohei Imamura Interview


By Richard Philips
Translated by Emiko Yamaguchi

Q: Could you explain your initial influences as a filmmaker, and why you decided to explore the lives of the most oppressed layers of society?
Shohei Imamura: Let me answer the first part of your question. I should tell you that I have very deep respect for Akira Kurosawa. This is someone that I idolised. At first I thought that he was a bit too rough but then learnt more about how he worked. For example, he used Toshiro Mifune in most of his films. I once visited Toho Studios and I saw Mifune and formed the opinion that he was not a good actor. He was really dreadful and had a dialect, a heavy accent in Japanese, and didn't seem to know the first thing about acting. But under the direction of Kurosawa he became a great performer. I was deeply impressed with how Kurosawa was able to mould Mifune from a ham into a really excellent actor.

Q: And the second part of my question?
SI: You are not the first one to ask me this question. Many people, not only in Japan, but also overseas have asked this. I'm not sure why you ask and I don't want you to look at my characters and say they are all oppressed or that they are the bottom of society. I don't agree with the way these people have been treated.
Many years ago, I was friendly with a well-known scriptwriter, who used to work with Yasujiro Ozu, and was staying with him at his holiday house. I was working on one of my scripts—it was a serious work—and he stood up from the fireplace, which was in the centre of the room, and came over and began reading the script over my shoulder. I thought this was a rather horrible and nasty thing to do, but then he said, “Oh you are still writing about beggars and all those dropouts from the mainstream of society.”
I didn't like this comment and it really started to get on my nerves because I didn't think this was the correct way to characterise these people, the ones you call oppressed. Even though some of the things these people say might sound ridiculous, their lives and the experiences they pass through are true-life issues and their comments are from the heart. They are human beings and even though they might be at the bottom of society, what they say is true. And if you are not moved by what they say and do in my films, then it is really my fault, not theirs, because it means that my films haven't accurately reflected their true feelings.
When I was younger I was angered about the comments of the big-guy filmmakers. I tried to rebel, but they just laughed at me. Unfortunately I couldn't really argue because they didn't treat me as an equal and so their statements hurt me very much.
After the comments from this leading scriptwriter I lay in bed that night and wondered how could I possibly argue against these big people. Then I decided, all right, if they don't like my ideas and treat them this way then I will only write about oppressed people all my life. I didn't say this openly, but kept it in my mind. I didn't have the confidence or the position to argue against them but this is what I decided to do.

Q: Could you comment on Japanese cinema and the present environment for filmmakers, compared to when you began making films?
SI: The way contemporary filmmakers approach their work can change rapidly, but if you ask me whether contemporary filmmakers are really looking straight into the social and political environment then I have to say it is quite dubious. There are many question marks about where contemporary films are heading and there are few films made today which indicate that the directors have a strong grip on the situation facing ordinary people. They don't seem to be able to look squarely at the real situation.

(Kuroi Ame, 1989)

Q: Most of your films deal with the poverty and social problems of immediate post-war Japan. Are any contemporary filmmakers dealing with the social issues produced by unemployment, the ongoing economic recession in Japan today?
SI: No, there are very few filmmakers examining these issues. A director could explore some of these themes for a long time and then, after it has accumulated for a long time in his mind, one day it will explode to the surface as a work. Unfortunately there are not many filmmakers looking at these questions.

Q: Your film Black Rain, which is being screened in Sydney next weekend, explores the inner torment of the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The film is very powerful and concludes with a strong anti-war statement from one of the characters. Could you comment?
SI: Black Rain refers to the radiation that fell on people after the atomic bombing. Most of those covered with this rain suffered terrible health problems and many died. My film is based on the well-known novel by Masuji Ibuse, which tells about the problems facing a young woman who was covered with black rain and therefore has great difficulty finding a prospective husband.
The novel is long and we could not put everything in the film, so I had to be selective. I met and talked in depth with many bomb survivors and was able to get a first-hand understanding of the cruelty and horror of the bomb. Some of the victims were badly disfigured and it was difficult to look into their eyes. It was very hard to produce a script that fully conveyed the terrible horror of this event.

Q: What was the response to the film when you first screened it.
SI: It was shown to foreign press correspondents in Japan after it was first released and we asked for their comments. Some journalists declared that because the Japanese started the Pacific War they shouldn't be complaining about the consequences. These severe comments came from the journalists from neighbouring countries such as Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Korea.
I tried to counter these statements by explaining that even if the war was started by Japan we want people to recognise the consequences of atomic weapons and war. I am afraid my argument was not philosophical enough for the journalists and they didn't seem to agree.
In America, and many other countries, the general opinion was that the bombing was the right thing to do. Although thousands of people were killed in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, many still argue that it was justified. Irrespective of these views we have an obligation to pass on the facts of this terrible event and make use of this film in every way possible to show the consequences of war.

Q: What role can cinema play in changing social life?
SI: It is a lot easier to be obedient and stay with the establishment, but this is not my way of life. I always try to change society completely with my films. Of course, filmmaking is not like catch. You can throw the ball but there is no guarantee that it will be caught.

(Kuroi Ame, 1989)

Q: What is the most important quality that young filmmakers must develop today?
SI: I am quite old now and have had many experiences that allow me to answer this question. I have been writing film scenarios for many years but sometimes feel that things I have said have been exaggerated, or not reported accurately. So whenever I am writing a script I am very aware that my films must be true.
This situation also confronts young scenario writers. They might get a good idea, become deeply involved in it and get so carried away with this idea that they end up telling lies. I think the most important thing is that their art must be true.
Another crucial quality for young filmmakers is courage. They must have courage to cut off any part of their film that is not true or accurate.
Let me give you an example. Near the end of Black Rain, the young girl is becoming ill from the fever caused by the radiation and starts to hallucinate. Everyone begins to realise that her days are numbered. Her uncle takes her to a pond where he had put some small carp fish months earlier. There are pampas grasses alongside the pond and it is quite a cold day. Suddenly a large carp jumps out of the pond and they are both very excited. The fish is about a metre long and she starts hitting the pampas grasses with her shawl in excitement and the pollen starts floating in the air, almost like snow.
This is an extremely beautiful and emotional scene but if it were extended it would become a lie. The impact of this scene on the audience is strong because it conveys the loneliness and sorrow of the young girl and the suffering of her uncle. It moves the viewers and demonstrates how sad and difficult it is to be a radiation victim.
Toru Takemitsu, a well-known Japanese composer who did the music for the movie, asked me to extend this scene because it is very good emotionally. But it has always been my policy not to get carried away by emotions and I was surprised that this brilliant composer wanted me to extend the scene.
So there was always a conflict between my policy of not being too emotional and being true to the fact, without being cold and not reaching the audience. This is a good example of how you must resist the pressures of others and hold to your own values. I have always insisted that I would never tell lies in my movies, to only tell the truth. This is a big principle for me.
In recent years, however, I have begun to explore fantasies. At the moment I am working on a new script about a woman passing through menopause who has fantasies and shoplifts. In this script I have to create her fantasies, so the difficulty is in creating truthful fantasies, or moments that are not exactly true in life. This is an interesting contradiction.

domingo, 25 de abril de 2010

Notes #10 - De Rerum Natura

(Muno no Hito, 1991)

Nowhereman (or The Man with no talent, Muno no Hito) is the quintessential portrait of, what we should call, a horizontal cinematic perspective. It is curious that 1991 is the same year Kitano's A Scene at the Sea (Ano natsu ichiban shizukana umi) or Oshii's Stray Dogs: Kerberos Panzer Cops (Jigoku no banken: kerubersu) were made. There is something similar aesthetically about the early nineties and we could emphasize that these three odd movies represent a subconscious common ground between three distinct auteurs: there is no climax, expression and feelings are left in the darkness and silence is the key to a quiescent dissolution of the characters and their psychology. In fact, only a quiet bleakness remains, as if filmed existence was equal to a shy river, flowing in the same direction without knowing it. Maybe the nature of things is the absence of their meaning. Maybe life has no words to describe its horizontal regularity. Maybe regularity is the absence of a meaning.

sábado, 24 de abril de 2010

Tampopo: Food and the Postmodern in the Work of Itami Juzo

(Tampopo, 1985)

By Timothy Iles

Abstract: Itami Jūzō’s film Tampopo possesses a structure and thematic richness that make it a prime example of postmodern film-making. Its use of food as visual metaphor and narrative device works together with its structure to privilege a decentred approach to plot, character, and story-telling. At the same time, the film’s subject matter and the series of vignettes which interfere with – while equally creating – its narrative flow reflect a cultural cosmopolitanism common in Japan by the time of the film’s production. This paper will argue that Tampopo can be read as a rebuttal of certain political attitudes that seek to present Japan as culturally homogeneous, socially stable, and ethnically unified. The film achieves this objective by offering a theoretically aware vision of Japan as composed of infinite and equal fragments held together only by convention, a vision of Japan as postmodern.

Food plays such a dominant, even defining, role in any culture that frequently when asked to name one’s favourite food, one replies with the name of a nationality rather than a dish. Yet food also possesses the double-edged potential to demonstrate its consumers’ sophistication and/or cultural appropriation. It is with this particular potential that Itami Jūzō’s popularly successful though academically overlooked 1986 film Tampopo plays, for this work of comedy utilises food as a vehicle to subvert an orthodox view of Japan – or of any culture, for that matter – as a homogeneity. Tampopo focuses its audience’s attention instead on the periphery of what it sees as a no longer dominant cultural hegemony. It does this by positing food as a metaphor for the changes brought by economic prosperity in modern Japan, and also by exposing along with those changes the speciousness of a prevalent view that holds the “nation” to be an a priori fact. Tampopo’s use of food allows it to demonstrate that, just as there is no “meal” apart from its “ingredients,” no whole without its parts, there is never a “centre,” or “nation,” apart from the peripheries that define it.
Tampopo, itself composed of fragments, postulates the value of the fragment as opposed to the impossibility of the whole – an always-already fragmentary artefact – through its visual style, its defeat of the linear narrative, and its awareness of the venerable adage that variety is the spice of life. In this sense, Tampopo serves a complex purpose: it functions as a consumer product of the entertainment industry, but it also skilfully capitalises on its consumer status to critique consumer culture. Further, Tampopo explores two aspects of this consumer culture: does consumer culture permit a society to define itself as the same, through the act of consumption; or does it in fact insist upon the privileging of difference within the products which form its object? This latter question allows Tampopo to engage with a political dilemma Japan encountered in the early 1980s, which Harootunian interprets as having specific social ramifications. Harootunian contends that the government at the time, headed by Prime Minister Ōhira, proposed to use consumerism as a vehicle to “meet the demands of culture and spirit […] [to implant] in the folk the superiority of specific cultural values” (Harootunian 1988: 461). These values were to re-install “traditional” forms of social interaction into post-industrial Japan, thus recreating the idea of a homogeneous nation. Tampopo is a film that in contrast proposes the heterogenising force of consumerism as an entranceway into the decentralising world of the postmodern.
As I will later explain, the concept of the postmodern is controversial in the context of Japan studies.1 The term does, however, possess a particular usefulness for describing the type of film Itami has created in Tampopo. Itami makes consistent use of such conventionally postmodern techniques as pastiche, parody and the subversion of the teleologically linear narrative in the process of his critique of Japanese consumer culture. He blends genres, characters, and visual echoes of earlier works to construct a dense surface held together not by a unity of plot or organic identity, but by the variety of foods that cross the screen. Further, this surface reflects a theoretical premise that supports its deconstruction of the “internationalisation” of Japan. In this sense, the film reaffirms Jameson’s observation that “the problem of postmodernism […] is at one and the same time an aesthetic and political one”(1984b: 373), for Itami questions both the styles of the genres his film parodies, as well as the underlying social significance of the illusory view of Japan as a “whole.” This paper will explore Itami’s project of revisioning Japan, not as the unified culture officially held forth, but rather as a culture composed of always-already peripheral elements, as likely to be foreign imports as domestic products.
Itami Jūzō (1933–1997), son of the actor Itami Mansaku, began his nearly forty-year long career as an actor in films such as Nise daigakusei (1960, False Student), Lord Jim (1965), and Otoko no kao wa rirekisho (1965, A Man’s Face Shows his Personal History). His debut as a director came in 1985 with Osōshiki (The Funeral), a comedy written by Itami in less than a week and built around the circumstances of a certain family after the death of the wife’s father. This film is a gentle social satire: it analyses the dilemma of a modern Japan that still feels an emotional need to retain the spiritual traditions that mark the shared events in life. The family at the centre of the film is certainly not without its flaws: during the several days spent with the wife’s mother, the husband’s mistress turns up at the house and throws a tantrum when he attempts to persuade her to leave, virtually forcing him to have sex with her. The wife, meanwhile in a bitingly parodic scene, swings upon a child’s toy, a suspended tree-trunk. And yet in the end, the members emerge as deeply attached and committed to one another as ever. Despite its affectionate portrayal of a family, though, the film does not show an awareness of the trend identified by Harootunian as “a relentlessly obsessive ‘return’ to ‘origins’: an orchestrated attempt by the state to compensate for the dissolution of the social by resurrecting ‘lost’ traditions against modernism itself, and by imposing a master code declaring ‘homogeneity’ in a ‘heterogeneous present’“ (1988: 448). Osōshiki’s engagement with this trend is neither fully articulated nor sustained. Nonetheless, it presents a solid critique of an age in which grieving family members, cosmopolitan urbanites, must turn to the convenience of “how-to” videos to re-learn the traditions of their country. In this way, they perpetuate within their very real emotions the socially prescribed methods of self-expression, which in a truly “traditional” setting they would have learned close at hand. The presence of the funeral “how-to” video within this film about modern funerals underscores the cultural force with which film has been invested in a technological age: it is far easier for this family to seek advice from the TV screen than from family members of an earlier generation. At the same time, the advice so received is of a distinctly “homogenised” nature that even turns of phrase and “spontaneous” outpourings of grief are carefully scripted. Schematically, the film subtly underscores the paradoxes of the role of technology in the consumption of tradition.
After Osōshiki, Itami released nine more films until his self-inflicted death in 1997. They all starred his wife Miyamoto Nobuko. Most of Itami’s films in fact utilise the same ensemble cast, featuring, among others, Yamazaki Tsutomu, Otaki Shūji, and Sakura Kinzō. Itami’s first three films display a consistently critical attitude towards Japan, and though they lack explicit political profundity, they possess something equally if not more important: accessibility. These films were extremely marketable, both within and outside Japan, and they secured for Itami an international reputation as a comedic director while affording him tremendous opportunity for artistic development. Osōshiki is a film of emotional moments, of vignettes that reveal intercharacter relations almost organically; Tampopo permits these moments and segments to dominate its structure; and the 1987 Marusa no onna (A Taxing Woman) solidifies the evolution of Itami’s central protagonist into a sensitive though powerful alternative to the Japanese “salaryman.” However, while these earlier works were all popularly and critically successful, his later works fall into an identifiable trend started by Marusa no onna. The trend is indicated by the formulaic nature of the titles given to many of these films, in the pattern of “xx no onna.” While the subject matter of these later films varies, their underlying construction does not: they are vehicles for Miyamoto Nobuko, and pit a strong, sincere, determined female character against a male establishment, which she is ultimately able to best. Rather than making Itami a feminist, however, these films serve to identify him as a satirist.
When Itami Jūzō released Tampopo in 1986, Japan was at the height of the so-called “bubble economy,” a time when the yen was strong, and Japan seemed to be the epitome of industrial wealth. Just six years earlier, the Japanese government had proclaimed a plan, which Harootunian identifies as aiming to institute a “new age of culture” (Harootunian 1988: 460). In this new age of culture, a superabundance of goods would permit the homogenisation of Japanese society so that the “promise of similitude” could be “secured against the spectacle of difference – history” (Harootunian 1988: 466). It would be a time in which consumerism would permit Japan the realisation of exceptional qualities: an “exemption from the uncertainties of change and the caprice of history,” and a position as a uniquely structured nation whose underlying social order stood unchanged from Stone Age times as the model of an extended family (ie) (Harootunian 1988: 466). This view of a unique Japan did not only prevail in Japan: Japanese management style and business models were receiving unprecedented and minute attention abroad as well, and seen as holding a powerful secret to efficiency and profit. Nonetheless, despite the apparent dawning of a “Japanese Age” on the international stage, domestically Japan was experiencing contradictory phenomena brought by consumerism. While the availability and quality of foreign products, tastes, and experiences were increasing at rates rivalling those of the Meiji Restoration over 100 years earlier, Japan’s Japaneseness was being critically re-evaluated by scholars and artists, sometimes with an intention of restoring the place of tradition in the modern world,2 but often with an intention of dismantling a received view of that very tradition.3
Itami’s Tampopo has a great affinity with this latter intention in that its underlying premise is a dismantling of the orthodox view of Japan as culturally stable. Its story concerns its main characters’ search for the perfect rāmen recipe, that is, a (now) identifiably Japanese dish. This search, however, takes its participants through the entire gamut of world cuisine present in Japan. Ironically, rāmen is in fact an imported dish of noodles and soup popular throughout Asia, as lo mien in China, and la myun in Korea. Thus, from its outset the film exposes, however subtly, the fallacy of a view of Japan as homogeneous and unique, while innocently exploring the increasing availability of foreign foods in Japan: food is a wonderful commodity capable of being both comfortingly familiar and adventurously exotic, the very synecdoche of the cultures from which it stems. Tampopo revolves around both of these poles, the familiar and the exotic. While it engages its audience in debate as to the implications behind a cosmopolitan Japan, a Japan in which kokusaishugi (internationalism) has become a fashionable buzzword, it also questions the validity of the view of Japan as a whole. Instead it proposes that Japan is, and in fact has always been, composed of infinite peripheries held in place by a type of artificial centre that its government had sought to establish the model of the family or village structure, a “‘functional, household-type corporate body’” where the “values of an agrarian order have been made to serve the requirements of a postindustrial society” (Harootunian 1988: 464–5). While Jameson suggests that “to grant some historical originality to a postmodernist culture is also implicitly to affirm some radical structural difference between […] consumer society and earlier moments of the capitalism from which it emerged”(1988: 373), an understanding of Itami’s work invites a re-evaluation of this proposal. Itami’s view of an international Japan defined by its consumerism accepts the premise that Japan has always been a consumer nation – but that only now is it finally able to enjoy the products it consumes.
The sense of enjoyment obvious in Tampopo represents an important aspect of the postmodern, and for me serves as one of its most poignant distinctions from the modernist angst that preceded it. While a modernist view of the world is dark and filled with a certain sturm und drang, a constant struggle of the individual to maintain his autonomy in the face of a controlling political or cultural totality, the postmodernist has accepted hisposition of alienation from a cultural “centre,” his political disenfranchisement, his isolation from his fellow man, and his role as a consumer for the products of multinational capitalism. Modernism reflects the entrenchment of industrialisation and urbanisation as dominant social modes wherein the individual is subordinate to the process of production: the whole, the unity is more important than the parts. The problem for the individual in a modernist setting is how to regain for himself a sense of his individuality, how to maintain his identity against a machinery, bureaucratic or otherwise, that seeks to make of him an anonymous consumer.
Japanese cinema has produced numerous truly great critiques of the modernist plight. Chief among them are, for example, Kurosawa’s 1952 film, Ikiru (English: To Live), in which a civil servant fights time, mortality, and tradition to produce something meaningful for the citizens of his ward; Mizoguchi’s 1954 Sanshōdayū (English: Sanshō the Bailiff), in which the son of an exiled, pacifist governor rises to power to redeem his father’s memory and crush the militarist opponents who caused the destruction of his family; and Teshigahara’s 1964 Suna no onna (English: Woman in the Dunes), in which a protagonist, nameless until the final frames of the film, fights his kidnapping by a village attempting to hold on to its outdated traditions. These films, and in fact the majority of traditional works of cinema, drama, or literature written in Japan or throughout the world, regardless of their explicit content, are marked by certain shared structural features: a unified, teleologically focused plot that tells one story from start to finish; a view of character that sees the individual as irreducible and complete; and a sense of organicism that sees the “work” as a closed system, both distinct from and yet incontrovertibly a product of its “author,” comprehensible according to its inner logic which in turn parallels the logic of “reality.” This viewpoint reflects a view of the world that appears self-evident: the view of the individual within society. And yet from this viewpoint the individual seeks to define himself as unique in order to achieve the impossible: a rejection of the social oligarchy. This search for unique self-identification and rejection of the social is conceived of as a problem, an impossibility; for within the modernist world the individual can have no centrally important identity, only one subordinate to the process, the whole. The individual can be only what his social function requires of him, yet within the society that permits him that function, he will remain isolated from his fellows and from political control over his own existence. In Sartre’s terms, it is within the democratic “trap for fools” that the individual exists (1977: 198–210).
The presence or absence of modernity forms for some a crucial factor in the debate as to the applicability of theories of modernism/postmodernism to Japan. Yoshimoto argues that “while modernisation can be achieved by acquiring advanced technology and by fostering the development of industry, Japan has been fundamentally excluded from modernity because the possibility of the latter is dependent on the success of colonialism dividing the world into the West and non-West” (1993: 106–7). Indeed, “the development of capitalism in Japan had been supported and facilitated by premodern institutions and communal ideologies” (Yoshimoto 1993: 112), which were not simply ‘leap-frogged’ over on the way to a suddenly modern construction – they were incorporated into the very fabric of Japanese politics during the first half of the 20th century to such an extent that an effective resistance to Japan’s military excesses was then precluded. Was Japan then ever in fact modern? While Yoshimoto may argue that “for the non-West, the coming of modernity and that of colonial subjugation have always been inseparable” (1993: 118), it is precisely its period of military expansionism that gives Japan its own colonial experience. Furthermore, Japan has the (unenviably) unique position of being both a colony and coloniser, not only in cultural terms but military ones as well. I fundamentally disagree that “the non-West can achieve the goal of modernising itself by advancement of technology, yet modernity remains always unobtainable to the non-West because what constitutes modernity is precisely the exclusion of the non-West from the modern, ‘universal’ West” (Yoshimoto 1993: 118). What constitutes “modernity” is an attitude that exists between social structures and individuals – even if not fully constituted as such in a “Western” sense. Modernity is a particular view of people as subjugated not to colonial powers, but to modes of production, and this view did in fact exist in Japan during its period of ‘modernisation’.
In contrast to this view of life as a struggle against alienation, a constant flight towards an ever-receding time of integration in a nurturing and flexible social order built around the sancitified autonomy of the individual, the postmodern is a rejection of modernist struggle, an acceptance of fragmentation and a revelling in the peripheral position that previously marked the individual as lost in modernism. The postmodern accepts marginalism and makes that location the site of significance. It is a displacement of the centre, a negation of the importance of the mainstream – or, as Lyotard puts it, the death of the “metanarrative” (1984). Thus alienation is no longer an issue: in the absence of the metanarrative, there is no longer a definition from which to be alienated. For the postmodern, the individual need no longer seek his individuality, the sum of his parts – he finds himself as the “parts of his sum,” as an ever-changing collection. The post-modern is therefore a liberation from structure, or the emergence in “consumer society […] of the structure without a subject, and the play of signs without a meaning” (Karatani 1993: 188). Structure is thus now a loose paradigm, a fashion, a “sample” with which the artist may play.
This liberation from structure as a defining feature of the postmodern implies a particular attitude towards the world, “that attitude which would enable even a person who has lost all goals and ideals to confront reality without falling into despair or nihilism” (Karatani 1993: 184). This attitude is redemptive, a transcendence of modernist nihilism, and permits the postmodern to be a joyous exploration of difference, of eclecticism, of humour. It is “the reinstatement of various genres” (Karatani 1993: 187) excluded by modernism; but importantly, it is also the reinstatement of one genre into every genre. Parody is thus a defining feature of the post-modern, and while Jameson may argue that pastiche is more correctly its hallmark (1984b), I would prefer to remark on the good-humoured wink that typically accompanies instances of postmodernist “borrowing.” Comedy plays a vital role in the postmodernist work, for comedy is a powerful tool against capitulation to a domineering social construct.
Thus Tampopo borrows from several distinct genres, yet always with the same sense of wonder at its very ability to do so: the detective film, western, gangster film, love story, and even soft-core roman-poruno find their echoes within its 114 minutes. Throughout this series of borrowings the thread of parody runs intact, however, and in fact verges on satire when the film approaches the notion of cultural homogeneity that forms the target of its ideological attack. In the Japan it represents on screen, Tampopo highlights the consumption of foreign products. On those rare occasions when it presents consumption of Japanese goods, it creates a strong association between this act and death. In one of the film’s many segments, a young housewife dies immediately after cooking her family’s humble evening meal, having been pulled from her deathbed by her husband, who is unwilling to accept the possibility of losing her. In another, a wealthy man dressed in a traditional haori [short over-jacket] nearly chokes on o-shiroko [sweet azuki-bean soup] in a Japanese restaurant. Later, at the home of this same man, a live turtle is slaughtered to provide the chief ingredient to a particular dish. Though each scene has its own emotional quality, the implications are politically rich: the cultural products of Japan are virtually malignant to its citizens. Consumption of typically “Japanese” products contains within it the potential for its own destruction.
Structurally, Tampopo mirrors its premise that Japan is a nation of peripheral fragments, rather than a unified cultural or social entity. To describe the “story” of Tampopo is to exercise one’s ability to think in fragments, for while the basic plot-line describes the relationship between Goro, a milk-truck driver (whose outfit is complete with authentic cowboy hat and bandana, and whose milk-truck sports the horns of a bull), and Tampopo, the female owner of a traditional Japanese noodle-shop started by her late husband, the film is composed of a series of vignettes and sketches that interfere with the forward progress of the story. These digressions all share several common threads, however, related to food, for each vignette depicts a particular aspect of a particular cuisine. As diverse as these segments and sub-stories are, the threads that bind them are strong ones – food shot in tantalising close-up; the myriad national cuisines that appear on screen; and the celebration of difference that informs every frame. At the same time, it is these threads that pull apart the fabric of the “modern” in Japan, and reveal the marginalia as the true locus of significance.
Yoshimoto has pointed out that “postmodernism, understood simultaneously as a radical break from and as a reflection on the modern, is inseparable from the expansion of multinational capital and [the] global information network. […] In the cultural sphere, Japan has transformed itself into a new type of audiovisual information society: constantly dismantled and reconstructed buildings […] sophisticated television commercials […] and new ‘high-tech’ gadgets introduced on a daily basis are part of what constitutes the imaginary landscape of the postmodern city of Tokyo” (Yoshimoto, 1993: 117). It is with this image of Japan that Tampopo plays. Reflecting the consumer culture that forms both its subject and its audience, Tampopo moves visually from vignette to vignette almost at the whim of the camera, as a bored shopper moves from store to store, or a gourmand moves from course to course. When the lens loses interest with the actions of one set of characters, it follows others as they pass into its frame to whichever destination awaits them, returning equally at whim to the story of the “main” characters, Goro and the noodle-shop owner. While the characters of these vignettes are all Japanese, they are not all of the culturally dominant middle class, and here Tampopo’s subversiveness becomes most apparent. Tampopo focuses on the culturally marginalised, the excluded, the peripheral human elements who form the bulk of capitalist, consumer-society Japan, but who find little voice in the political or economic arena. The female shop-owner after whom the film is named only barely manages to make a living for herself and her young son; Goro, the milk-truck driver, is a rootless drifter – a Tōkyō Clint Eastwood who goes from town to town along his delivery route; the vagabonds to whom Goro turns for help to teach Tampopo the secret of making the perfect bowl of noodles are precisely that – vagabonds, the homeless flotsam who populate the back alleys of the modern city. The character who introduces the film is a gangster – a member of the yakuza – who bullies a hapless movie patron in the film’s opening scene, and then dies in a hail of gunfire towards its close. These characters populate contemporary Japan, but are different from most others in contemporary Japanese cinema: even a film as anti-bourgeois as Tsukamoto Shinya’s Tetsuo (1992) still places its narrative firmly within the middle-class world of electronic gadgets and alienation that it seeks to negate, and still maintains an essentially unified view of the individual as, in fact, a traditional “identity.” While Kitano Takeshi’s work brings the ultra-violent underworld of drug addicts and criminals to the Japanese screen, it does so within the framework of traditional middle-class values. There is a moral sense of what is “obviously” right and wrong in these films, which is accepted without question.
In contrast, Tampopo follows the lead set in Osōshiki, and subverts any sense of bourgeois “correctness.” While Osōshiki did this through its exposure of the “younger” generation’s loss of traditional awareness, Tampopo does this through its whole-heartedly sincere presentation of the vagabonds and marginal people who are its main concern. While portraying the vagabonds as true connoisseurs of fine cuisine, Tampopo dissects the seriousness with which the middle-class pursue their roles as consumers of international products, and satirises their obsessive need for precise mimicry of foreign manners or tastes. In one biting vignette, a group of finishing-school girls who are learning the “correct” way of eating Italian pasta furnish the film with an opportunity to expose the superficiality of this mass-market appropriation of a so-called “internationalism.” The girls’ exasperated instructor discovers that her insistence on manners and propriety stands no chance of acceptance when her young pupils encounter a real, live foreigner noisily enjoying his own plate of pasta. She herself succumbs to the obvious pleasure with which he is eating, and begins to slurp her own dish with joy as her pupils indulge their hunger without the least reserve. Postmodern consumerism defines itself through nothing less than this exuberant self-abandon – not in order to reaffirm a national identity, thus overcoming modernity to reintroduce a “traditional” social homogeneity, but to permit the individual his or her own joie de vivre.
Tampopo finds its interest, and in fact its “story,” within the collection of its peripheral characters. Avoiding the relentless linearity of, say, Kurosawa’s films, Tampopo tells its story through loops and meanderings. Its “story” is no longer teleological and focused on a unity of character and meaning, but rather is open to the interruptions which its view of reality invites. Although it comes to an end when Tampopo’s noodle-shop is reopened (the perfect rāmen recipe having been found), stylistically it could easily carry on into another segue. Almost free of its own metanarrative, save for its commercial necessity to “make sense,” the “unity” of the work comes from its opening and closing credits rather than from a singularity of structure. In fact the greatest feeling of closure comes from the presence of the gangster character at its outset and near its end: Tampopo thus permits its margins to dictate its story in a fashion that adheres to the postmodern acceptance of the periphery.
How, though, does this happen? I have already mentioned one visual “trick” that the camera uses to move from story to story, in pursuit of a character who seems more interesting than the ones on screen at the moment. But even from its outset, the film frustrates its own narrative flow by offering three “false starts” to its action. The first of these introduces the audience to the gangster character as he settles into his seat at a movie theatre. He addresses the camera directly, instructing the audience to be silent during the screening, since nothing bothers him more than interruptions. As “his” movie begins, the film moves to its second false start: the screen fills with the image of a younger man seated next to an older man at a noodle restaurant. The older man is instructing the younger in how to eat noodles properly. While the instruction continues, the camera quickly cuts to the third starting point, this time the “true” one: the inside of a truck’s cab, as Goro and Gun, the “main” characters of the “main” story, drive towards their destination on a rain-filled night. Gun had been reading to Goro, and the audience comes to realise that the scene in the noodle restaurant is the subject of Gun’s narration. The film proper begins with Goro and Gun themselves arriving at a noodle-shop, where they meet Tampopo.
This series of starts displaces the action of the film, and defers the audience’s encounter with the “main” characters; but more importantly, it relativizes that story and shows it to be no more important than the marginalia that have preceded it. Significantly, the marginalia even from the earliest moments of the film are linked through the presence of different types of food in each shot: the gangster with the multi-course Western-style feast his accomplices serve while he watches his film; the noisy packet of crisps with which another audience member disturbs him; and the noodles on which the camera lingers so longingly in the narration of Gun’s book. Each type of food is as relevant as the next, despite its differences, and for the consumers, it represents the fulfilment of their momentary desires. But these different types of food also suggest their respective consumer’s character: the gangster revels in extravagance, the anonymous audience member enjoys the banality of crisps, while the main character is shown to be an honest man by his hunger for an honest bowl of Japanese noodles. Food here takes on an almost moral quality as it segregates these consumers into social strata. I say “almost,” for while the film allows one particular type of food, Japanese, to assume an apparently central role, it does so only to displace that centrality much as its opening sequence displaces the centrality of the main story.
The search for a perfect rāmen recipe does form an important layer in Tampopo, but it is a layer that the film’s structure relativises within a larger consideration of the many other layers that make up its whole. While this search continues, the camera takes the audience from the squalour of Japan’s homeless to the opulence of a wealthy man’s home. Yet in each of these diametrically opposed locations it finds true sensitivity to and appreciation of the beauty of food. The beggars (from whose midst arises an aged doctor who teaches Tampopo the importance of soup) are the true gourmets, able to speak poetically about the meals they enjoy, gathered from trash tossed out of the best restaurants in town. In fact they criticise the declining quality of these restaurants, and seem sincerely troubled by this trend. As the aged doctor departs with Tampopo and Goro, the beggars with whom he has been living gather together to salute him with a valedictory song – their voices are superb, their intonation cultured and sentimental. This scene is clear in its implications: it is not among the mainstream that beauty can be found, but along the periphery of a culture that its measure can best be taken. While the film follows the progress of a Japanese woman in her quest to become a successful chef of an apparently Japanese dish, the people who assist her in this task, who in fact serve as the repositories of an authentic national identity – authentically national exactly because of their international appreciation of their country’s position – are precisely not the ones from whom this knowledge is typically to be expected. Rather, they are the marginalised people whom the mainstream would prefer to exclude from its self-identity – the outsiders who have made for themselves a life outside the modernist system.
Moreover, Tampopo herself is a marginalised person, a woman forced to fulfil two roles, that of mother and homemaker, as well as businesswoman in a patriarchal society. Her shop was founded by her late husband, but his death has left her the difficult task of succeeding on her own merit. Itami’s film is aware of the difficulty a woman would face in this situation; in fact, every other chef it portrays is male, and Tampopo herself implicitly recog- nises the unlikelihood of her success when she begs Goro to teach her the secrets she lacks. While it contains an awareness of a typically chauvinistic male attitude towards female entrepreneurs, Tampopo permits this woman to achieve her goal, and to realise her own strength in having done so. At the film’s close, Tampopo is behind the counter of her newly rebuilt res- taurant, at peace with her work and able to take pride in satisfying the demands of her customers. Goro takes his leave of her, driving off into the stylistically necessary “sunset” of the orthodox happy ending. Yet even this ending, so typical of the cowboy-story, has its measure of parody, for rather than Tampopo herself or her young son running after Goro as he rides away and begging him to stay behind and build a new life together, it is Pisuken, one of Tampopo’s oldest customers, who tries to persuade Goro to stay. The cowboy story is here subverted one final time, and most effectively, too, in that these two characters were the ones who established the presence of that genre earlier on when they fought each other in a brawl of which even John Wayne would be proud.
Aware of genre, and aware, too, of its parody of these genres, Tampopo provides its audience with sufficient visual clues to understand its intentions, thus guiding the audience to an awareness of their own position as cultural progenitors. Tampopo accepts its position as an entertainment-industry artefact precisely for this purpose of questioning its status as a consumer product. Consumption of international goods alone is not sufficient to create an “international” nation, Itami seems to argue; what is also necessary is a sense of national scepticism. As Najita Tetsuo has said, “[U]nder high-growth economics, technology has been ideologised with strong and pronounced references to distinctive cultural characteristics […], one of the tensions that is likely to surface in the […] postmodern context is the resistance to this ideological use of culture” (Najita 1988: 413). It is precisely toward this aim of resisting such an overtly distinctive cultural identity that Tampopo works. Rather than accepting a governmentally sanctioned metanarrative of Japanese identity proven through hyperconsumerism of foreign products, Tampopo does not allow its audience complacency in the act of consumption: with the increasing presence of foreign goods in Japan, the very identity of Japan becomes open to commodification as well, and to scepticism. In Tampopo, this commodification is not at all negative; rather, it recreates Japan as relative to the rest of the world, a margin able to revel in its own marginality. The value of the margin is the informing principle of this film, and one of its redemptive visions of Japan as a construct comes from this principle. Japan as a product of its own culture is able to change, and the commodification of that culture gives its participants the possibility of flexibility. They are now free to be “Japanese” at lunch and “Italian” at dinner – or “French,” “American,” or any other “identity” that suits their palate of the moment.
Once again, it is food that permits a fuller realisation of this view. In one particularly effective vignette, rich in its parody of the Japanese salaryman as well as for its confirmation of the value of the margin, a group of businessmen are about to order their lunch at an exclusive French restaurant. They have with them an obviously, and painfully, junior associate. The menu is in French, which the executives, again both obviously and painfully, cannot read. The first executive makes his decision: sole meuničre accompanied by an imported German beer, without salad, but with consommé. In turn each executive repeats this order – but with the air of having arrived independently at his respective decisions –, till it is the junior office-clerk’s turn. He has travelled, and reads French fluently. He knows the exact restaurants in France from which the chef has learned his trade; he knows the perfect wine to accompany his meal; he selects the perfect salad to prepare his palate. He orders with pleasurable anticipation of the feast to come, despite the constant kicks to his shins from his embarrassed senior. It is this young businessman who succeeds in making a mockery of the executive culture for which Japan is widely known. It is this young man who single-handedly deconstructs the image of Japan as a conservative nation of tasteless businessmen, while demonstrating that image’s superficial veracity. The junior clerk demonstrates the vitality of the margin, the true centre of this decentred land, and demonstrates, too, that consumerism can have its cultured and voluptuous sides. This junior clerk is a consumer, as are his companions, but his consumption is informed with pleasure: his consumption is postmodern precisely to the extent that he will enjoy his meal, content to be a peripheral member of the lunch party. Here, too, it is the periphery that supplies the standard by which the true depths of cultural sophistication and the true depths of both Japan’s international sensitivity and identity, may be measured.
Tampopo is a visually rich, thematically clever film. Content with its commercial status, it nonetheless holds many signs of an important theoretical awareness, which still do not interfere with the integrity of its particular form of structural “disunity.” This work challenges a view of the “nation” as solid and self-defining, in its place offering a flexible alternative built around a decentralised “individual” whose identity is as changeable as fashion, yet also is unassailable. The individual becomes free to pursue his individuality to the same extent that Tampopo is free to pursue the digressions that give it its substance, even if that individuality is to be defined through its absence. For the film, its “individuality” is defined as the frames that exist between its start and close, yet its ending intimates an eternal continuance: the final scene is of a mother breastfeeding her newborn child. This scene contains within it an attitude, for “the Japanese post-modern […] is supremely indifferent to the possibility of an end” (Wolfe 1988: 587). While this may appear as a hopelessly pessimistic pronouncement, implying that “the semiotic overtones of […] the postmodern convey to its advocates a claustrophobic sense that there is nowhere else to go except in circles, via […] the endless circulation of increasingly unnecessary consumer goods and images” (Wolfe 1988: 587), Tampopo presents this attitude with far greater sensitivity. True, the child has been born as a consumer into a world of consumption, but his or her life will have the freedom to develop according to the whims of the individual living it. The child may grow as simply or as complexly as he or she may choose, and will enrich or diminish the society in which he or she lives in direct proportion. For, as Tampopo has demonstrated, the value of the whole is to be measured by the variety of its components.



Notes:
1 For a provocative though all too brief discussion of this issue, see Miyoshi and Harootunian (1988).
2 See for instance Suzuki Tadashi’s work in the theatre (Iles 1999: 60–67) and the program of the Ōhira government of 1980 (Harootunian 1988: 460–468).
3 See for example the work of Abe Kōbō or the social criticisms of Murakami Ryū.

References:
Harootunian, Harry D. (1988): Visible Discourses/Invisible Ideologies. In: South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 443–474.
Iles, Timothy (1999): Suzuki Tadashi and the Revitalisation of Japanese Theatre. In: Theatre InSight, vol. 10, no.1 (Spring), pp. 60–67.
Jameson, Fredric (1984a): Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. In: New Left Review no. 146 (July–August), pp. 53–92. — (1984b): The Politics of Theory: Ideological positions in the postmodernism debate. In: New German Critique, no. 33 (Fall), pp. 53–65.
Karatani, Kōjin (1993): Origins of Modern Japanese Literature. (tr. Brett de Bary) Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Lyotard, Jean-Franēois (1984): The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Miyoshi, Masao, and Harry D. Harootunian (1988): Introduction to “Postmodernism and Japan.” (special issue). In: South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 387–399.
Najita, Tetsuo (1988): On Culture and Technology in Postmodern Japan. In: South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 401–418.
Sartre, Jean Paul (1977): Elections: A Trap for Fools. In: Sartre, Jean Paul, Life/Situations (tr. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis). New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 198–210.
Wolfe, Alan (1988): Suicide and the Japanese Postmodern. In: South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 571–589.
Yoshimoto, Mitsuhiro (1993): Melodrama and Japanese Cinema. In: Dissanayake, Wimal (ed.), Melodrama and Asian Cinema. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–126.

quinta-feira, 22 de abril de 2010

Signs taken from Monsters: What made Godzilla so Angry then?

(Gojira, 1954)

By Hiromi Nakano
Introduction

After reviving the Gamera franchise in the 1990s, Shusuke Kaneko, a former roman porno director at Nikkatsu studios, created Godzilla, Mothra and King Ghidorah: Giant Monsters All-out Attack (hereafter GMK ) in 2001. With a strong nationalistic subtext, the film is basically built in a revenge-play framework. The work eventually grossed more than ¥1 billion on 2.4 million at the box office paid admissions.
The so-called Gamera trilogy─ Gamera, Guardian of the Universe (1995), Gamera 2, Attack of Legion (1996) and Gamera 3, Revenge of Iris (1999)─is said to have set a new standard for monster films ( Kaiju eiga as fans call it in Japanese) with a serious tone, a hip sensibility and great technical skill. GMK does almost the same simulation of the disasters caused by monsters as the Gamera trilogy does, but its emotional power, instinctive impact and social relevance render this movie quite unique and distinctive.This paper focuses on the provocative aspect of GMK , and aspires to find out how Japanese culture and society are revealed through disasters named monsters.
(Gojira, 1954)


Disasters Named Monsters

The Heisei Godzilla series (1989─96) left some lingering dissatisfaction to the hard-core fans. Their complaints were as follows: Godzilla seldom wrestled other monsters physically; the destruction of cities was portrayed as not involving the direct loss of human life; the death of human beings at the hands (or feet) of monsters was never depicted; politicians and the military leaders remained observing and commenting rather than taking responsibility for decisive action themselves; people appeared impotent and reduced to frustrated spectators in a distant place (Kiridoshi, 2002: 64─7).
GMK seems to have addressed these problems in its own way.First and foremost, a large number of people are killed. Human life inevitably becomes the victim of bad accidents caused by monsters. In a scene, for example, brutal motorcycle gangs are annoying the residents at the foot of Mount Myoko in Niigata Prefecture. Baragon, one of three legendary guardian deities ─ the Sacred Beasts of Yamato ─ appears from the mountain and buries them alive in a tunnel.
Another scene represents some young punks robbing a convenience store by Lake Ikeda in Kagoshima Prefecture, going on a drinking spree and trying to drown a little puppy. Then Mothra, another Sacred Beast, emerges from the lake and drowns them.
Bad guys should be punished. These depictions surely give guilty pleasure to monster lovers. However, matters take a turn for the worse. Baragon appears next around the Owakudani valley, a tourist attraction in Hakone district. Many tourists are insensitive to the impending danger, taking a picture of the monster and saying, “Itʼs scary but it's cute as well.” At that very moment, the cliff behind them collapses and Godzilla emerges. A great number of crumbling rocks rain down upon the tourists, and they are crushed to death by debris. People lose all means of escape in the face of Godzilla.
For Godzilla fans, his appearance over a hill evokes the monsterʼs first-ever grand entrance on Odo Island in Gojira (1954). GMK is, in a sense, a cinematic tribute to the first Godzilla movie. In the plot of GMK , Godzilla is said to have rampaged in Japan only once in 1954. Producer Tomoyuki Tanaka observed, “The theme of the film [the original, from the beginning, was the terror of the Bomb. Mankind had created the Bomb, and now nature was going to take revenge on mankind” (Ryfle, 1998: 20 as quoted in Tsutsui, 2004: 18). GMK depicts the destruction of Shimizu City in Shizuoka Prefecture. Godzilla destroys the city with his radioactive breath, drawing a nuclear blast with a mushroom cloud. An elementary school teacher (acted by Kazuko Kato) gasps, “What? Is it an atomic bomb?” Audiences see a nuclear weapon in Godzilla himself.
Director Kaneko says in an interview, “Godzilla is a wild fellow, rowdy and a hooligan. He is ill-natured, mean and dirty” (Kiridoshi, 2002: 442). The creature is indeed a murderous, ruthless, radioactive villain in the film. In an impressive fighting scene with Baragon, Godzilla, twice the size of his opponent, kicks the Sacred Beastʼs body again and again, and stamps on its face over and over. It looks like a bad boy is cruelly bullying a weak child. Godzilla attacks his enemies persistently and relentlessly in GMK. That kind of characterization is represented best in some sequences in which certain persons encounter Godzilla again and again.
The creature first comes ashore at Magonote Island, which is located near Odo Island. Young people in a tourist home of the island are chatting in the ping-pong room. A girl (Tomoe Shinohara) casually says, “Itʼs sad that the Security Forces should kill it. Why donʼt they protect and keep it?” At that very moment, they are assaulted by Godzilla. Later on, this girl is in a hospital of Shimizu City, strapping her broken legs, unable to flee. She becomes hysterical when Godzilla stomps by the hospital; with the creature apparently passed, she sighs in relief, only to have a belated flick of Godzillaʼs tail blast the ward.
This episode may be reminiscent of a scene in the 1954 Gojira , in which the monster is bringing ruin to Tokyo when a woman cowers beside a Ginza building, holding her young children close as flaming debris rains down upon them. “Weʼll be joining your father soon,” she moans, referring to a husband killed in the World War II. “Just a little longer, a little longer.” Godzilla takes on the dark character of war personified (Tsutsui, 2004: 37). The original Gojira also represents the fear in which certain people meet disasters more than once.
A person with a traumatic experience suffers the same terrible pain once again. If we watch the sequence above when we were children, a sort of trauma might haunt us a long time. GMK was released as a double-bill with cartoons featuring Hamutaro, an adventurous and cute hamster. Kaneko once commented that he wanted to make the kids, who look forward to seeing Hamutaro, cry and scream over GMK (Kiridoshi, 2002: 342)
(San Daikaiju: Chikyu Saidai No Kessen, 1964)


For whom does the military work?

When Gamera, Guardian of the Universe was released in 1995, the Great Hanshin Earthquake happened, and then the Aum Shinrikyo cult carried out the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system that killed 12 people and injured some 5,500. When GMK was premiered in 2001, the Sept. 11 terroristsʼ attack occurred in USA. Traumatic realities have surpassed fictional worlds in recent years. We have to endure the unpredictable assaults of earthquakes, typhoons or man-made destruction like war and terrorism. These unreasonable and outrageous incidents are personified in Godzilla, which calls the raison dʼêtre of the military into question in the film.
In the plot of GMK , the Security Forces are maintained under the Constitution of the Peopleʼs Republic of Japan. The pacifist constitution justifies the possession of a self-defense military. Furthermore, Japan observes a peace treaty with USA and Russia in this parallel world. In a shot, Admiral Tachibana (Ryudo Uzaki) lectures in the Naval Academy that Godzillaʼs only prior attack on Japan was in 1954, when the Security Forces expelled the monster from Japan. Audiences find that GMK offers some sober reflections on nationalism and the role of the military in contemporary Japan. The army plays a major role in the movie, which portrays Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen as capable, dedicated and honorable. Kaneko confides in an interview as follows:
«The famous passage in Article 9 of the Constitution: “Land, sea, and air forces, as well as war potential, will never be maintained” is contradictory to the fact. So we need to change the Constitution but we shouldnʼt conclude any military alliance with other countries. I canʼt recognize Japanʼs right to collective self-defense to act with the United States, while both the left wing and the right one are criticizing me for my opinion.»(Kiridoshi, 2002: 440)
Article 9 renounces war and prohibits the nation from maintaining a military, even though it does. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party are pushing to change the Constitution─especially Article 9─and pave the way for Japan to engage in collective defense, which they call the right to collective self-defense. The current interpretation of the Constitution bans such action. Clause 1 of Article 9 states the nation forever renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. To accomplish this aim, Clause 2 says the country will not maintain a military or recognize the right of belligerency. This has kept the status of the Self-Defense Forces controversial.
Kaneko directed the films of the Gamera trilogy in cooperation with the Self-Defense Forces of Japan (SDF). That is why he couldnʼt shoot any fighter-crash scenes. Concerning GMK, however, SDF did not cooperate in making the film. The first thing Kaneko wanted to do was to make a jet fighter crash into a field. Moreover, the scene shows a lot of people killed in plane crash. The picture shows the military does not always play the role of the guardian of people.
Men and women in uniform dutifully undertake the necessary humanitarian and administrative functions─evacuating cities and caring for the injured─as professional skilled workers. The film offers a high tribute to the professionalism, resolve and determination of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the military proves helpless against Godzilla. Seeing it with his own eyes, Admiral Tachibana says to himself, “Did our army really expel the monster from Japan fifty years ago?”
Secretary Hinogaki (Kunio Murai) gives him a true account of the event. According to him, one scientist [Dr. Serizawa] invented a lethal weapon [Oxygen Destroyer] fifty years ago, which disintegrates the oxygen in water, suffocating all living organisms. The device was the only weapon that could terminate Godzilla. "A Hinogaki added, “The conventional arms didnʼt work at all and the Security Forces were totally useless at that time. But if this fact were unveiled, that would lead to the unfavorable argument that Japan need not possess any military power. Thatʼs why the authorities must conceal the fact from the public. Well, thatʼs my job, indeed.”
This episode arouses our interest in the post-World War II Japanese discourse over militarization. William Tsutsui, an associate professor of history at the University of Kansas, rightly observes:
«Under the pressures of the Cold War, Japan did cautiously remilitarize, but only under the banner of “Self Defense Forces” ( Jieitai ), ground, maritime, and air units charged and equipped solely for limited defensive action. Although sentiment in Japan favoring a more substantial military capability has surged from time to time (most notably in recent decades), the majority of the Japanese populace has strongly embraced pacifism and resisted Japanʼs reemergence as a regional military power.» (Tsutsui, 2004: 95─6)
Facing the decisive battle against Godzilla, Tachibana confesses to his colleague (Takeo Nakahara) that he feels pride in not experiencing any actual fighting. Kaneko says, “Some may consider it dishonorable to have no combat experience. I donʼt think that. We should take pride in what Japanese people have learned during the last fifty years” (Kiridoshi, 2002: 439). GMK implicitly inquires what the military signifies to people in Japan.
(Kaiju Daisenso, 1965)


What made Godzilla so angry then?

As a child, Tachibana had a traumatic experience in face of Godzilla fifty years ago, when he was separated from his parents due to the monster. He has never met them since then. “I can never forget the cries for help of men and women, who were killed by him,” he shouts. Actually, this line of the officer is quite different from the original one in the screenplay. It was supposed to say, “What made Godzilla so angry then?” (Kiridoshi, 2002: 440─1)
The original line will naturally lead us to think about what monsters symbolize. The film seeks to locate monsters in the foundational mythology of Japan. It posits that three legendary guardian deities rose from the earth to defend the country from Godzillaʼs rampages. Long time ago, an ancient dynasty got rid of various monsters in the course of its conquest, then worshipped them as deities. The custom and practice were taken over by the Yamato State.
The subject material of this anecdote comes from Motohiko Izawaʼs novel, Gyakusetsu no Nihonshi (The paradoxical History of Japan). Given the Imperial Family succeeds distantly to the throne of the Yamato State, the anecdote turns out a politically bold statement about the root of the emperor system of Japan. Actually, Gamera 3, Revenge of Iris tried to take up this argument and brought out one question, “What makes monsters attack Japan?” Its answer was so much concerned with Japanese traditional culture that the main stage of the movie was set in Kyoto, the ancient capital.
In the original scenario of Gamera 3 by the screenwriter Kazunori Ito, who scripted the animated classic Ghost in the Shell, the Moribe family has long inherited a peculiar system of scapegoats, in which the children in this family have been sacrificed to Ryu-Sei-Chou, a deity of the family. The custom has kept the Moribe family prosperous until now. This anecdote was eventually cut from the plot for fear that it should lead to a problem about the origin of the emperor system ( Gamera Perfect Box , 1999).
In Kanekoʼs original idea of GMK , the Sacred Beasts of Yamato were supposed to consist of Varan, Baragon and Angilas. President Matsuoka of Toho studios, however, ordered him to change Varan and Angilas into Mothra and King Ghidorah. It was because some market research suggested that women like Mothra and men preffer King Ghidorah (Kiridoshi, 2002: 444; Tsutsui, 2004: 69).
As Norio Akasaka has persuasively described, Godzilla and Mothra would often come to Japan from across the seas in several movies. But interestingly, Varan and Rodan emerge from the interior of Japan. There is an underlying structure of the opposition between the central and the marginal in Japan. Varan appears around the basin of the Kitakami River which was the base of the Ezo people, while Rodan inhabits Mount Aso where the Kumaso people lived as their base. Both native people resisted the invasion of the Yamato State to the last (Akasaka, 1992a).
Masao Higashi points out that Varan is called “Bataragi” by the inhabitants in Varan the Unbelievable (1958). He connects that name with “Arahabaki,” a deity that native people in Touhoku regions worshipped. a Historically, the Yamato State (the central) would regard native people (the marginal) as monsters like ʻOniʼ (ogre) and ʻTsuchigumoʼ (ground-spider). That kind of perception is often showed in Kaiju eiga genre (Higashi, 1992).
It is very interesting to sacralize three monsters as the ultimate protectors of Yamato/Japan when it comes to issues of power and order. How do power and order emerge from the chaotic stage where everyone fights against everyone? As Hitoshi Imamura puts it, the confusing situation comes to an end when one member becomes the only target of the violence by the rest of members. Focusing all the forces upon one object, the other members can evade each otherʼs violence. The one member that has been excluded is considered to be defiled, stained and abject by the others. After getting rid of those scars with a certain ritual, that one is sacralized by the others. This is the way power and order emerge from chaos (Imamura, 1982; Imamura, 1992).
This theory is especially useful in understanding the closing sequences of GMK , in which the Sacred Beasts of Yamato fight side-by-side with the Security Forces to subdue Godzilla. Turning their violence toward their common two forces are able to avoid arousing any unnecessary antagonism and identify each other as protectors of the nation state. Thatʼs why Godzilla has to be constructed as the outsider.
But we cannot take things so simply and easily. Now letʼs get back to the initial question, “What made Godzilla so angry then?” GMK is based on an interpretation of Godzilla long favored by right-wing critics in Japan. One ghostly old man (Hideyo Amamoto) in the movie explains, “The souls of countless people who fell victim in the Pacific War gathered in Godzillaʼs body.” The monster proceeds to attack Japan because people have forgotten the agony of those killed in the war.
Akira Ifukube, who composed the score of the 1954 Gojira , once noted that, for his generation, which came of age in the 1940s, Godzilla was like the souls of Japanese soldiers who died in the Pacific Ocean during the war (Igarashi, 2000: 116 as quoted in Tsutsui, 2004: 37). In the same vein, Akasaka argues that Godzilla represents the unquiet souls of soldiers and sailors who died in the Pacific during World War II, returning to Japan to wreak vengeance (Akasaka,1992b). These explanations for Godzilla and his blind fury link GMK to the original Gojira. The monster becomes a powerful symbol of Japanʼs repressed memories and suppressed patriotism.
Godzilla is heading for Tokyo in the same way as he was fifty years ago. Lieutenant General Mikumo (Shinya Oowada) groans, “Why Tokyo?” No clear-cut answer is offered in the film, but Akasaka reasons that like the spirits of the war dead, Godzilla (in the original film) would head toward the Imperial Palace. There again, Tsutsui has some truly interesting things to say:
«Japanese commentators have also long linked Godzilla with Saigo Takamori, a nineteenth-century samurai warrior who led an ultimately futile revolt in 1876─1877 against a modernizing, Westernizing national regime. Saigo, beloved in Japan as a principled and sincere rebel in the mold of Robert E. Lee, was the model for the character Katsumoto in the 2003 Hollywood epic The Last Samurai . Some suggest that Godzilla, like Saigo, turned his wrath on Tokyo as a protest against slavish Westernization and the dilution of Japanʼs national spirit. GMK repeatedly invokes the Saigo connection: Mothra first appears in a lake associated with Saigo, and the midget submarine that Admiral Tachibana pilots in the decisive battle against Godzilla is named the Satsuma , after the home province of Saigo in southern Japan.» (Tsutsui, 2004: 220)
Is this a curious variation on the opposition between the central and the marginal? Furthermore, literary critic Takayuki Tatsumi makes us aware of Yasuo Nagayamaʼs postcolonialist reading of Godzilla. In his opinion, the monster may have had his genesis not in a nuclear mishap but rather in a pseudoreligious and pseudoscientific theory championed by 19th-century Shintoist Masumi Ohishigori (Nagayama, 1992: 185─8 as quote in Tatsumi, 2006: 175). Tatsumi convincingly remarks:
«From the end of the Edo era up through the Meiji era, Ohishigori was so aware of the limits of Shintoism that he modernized it so it could catch up with Christianity or Buddhism. Thus, deeply influenced by the rise of Darwinism and paleontology, Ohishigori the Shintoist, a practitioner of ancestor worship, came to invent an amazing theory that located the origin of man in dinosaurs born of Japanese gods. This theory of dinosaurs as the origin of the Japanese had a tremendous impact on one of the mystic cult, Oomoto-kyo, which was very active in the Taisho era.» (Tatsumi, 2006: 175)
The members of this cult believed some dinosaurs still survive in the ocean as dragon gods. When we recall that Ohishigoris the original Godzilla seems to have emerged from the sea, we feel certain that the monsterʼs creators had Ohishigoriʼs theory somewhere in the backs of their minds.
What does Godzilla mean in GMK ? Is he the son of the atomic bomb? Is he wrath incarnate and a vengeful god with the image of unquiet and violent homecoming souls of Japanʼs war dead? Or, is he an uncontrollable, unfathomable catastrophe visited upon a helpless Japan? At least, we cannot regard the monster as a simple outsider. The point is what the picture tells us about our society and ourselves through the creature.
(Gojira, 1954)


Conclusion

If Godzilla embodies the souls of the Japanese soldiers, he is not the ultimate alien but an insider, ʻone of us.ʼ We ʻthe selfʼ as well as ʻthe other.ʼ Nevertheless, we should remember the monsterʼs milky eyes have no pupils, which represent death. We donʼt fear Godzilla because he is such a disaster that we lose all empathy for him, but because he is the living dead.
The living dead represents the confusion between life and death. They are positioned as the ambivalent presence in the boundary between this world and the other world. Monsters are born under such a border and disturb the established order of society on the earth. So we are extremely horrified by them (Girard, 1972, 1982).
The 1954 Gojira begins with a reference to the Lucky Dragon No.5 (Dai-go Fukuryu Maru) incident. A small Japanese trawler in search of tuna strayed close to the nuclear testing zone of Bikini Atoll in the central Pacific. The seamen were exposed to radiation, and tainted tuna entered Japanese markets before the radioactive contamination was discovered. The original Gojira surely evoked in its viewers the memories of the past war and nuclear anxiety as a clear and present danger. Audiences could consider themselves victims under imminent threat from outside.
However, we must acknowledge the fundamental change in what realities signify from fifty years ago. The original Gojira was intended to frighten rather than amuse the audiences with Japanese unease over a mounting nuclear menace and the long shadows of World War II. In contrast, GMK lets us see our worst nightmares and conquer them cinematically, exorcising our deepest demons through a process into which a subtle patriotic subtext is interwoven.
Today, we experience plenty of things through the various media. Those devices might present an appalling disaster as an amusing spectacle, giving us the aesthetic enjoyment of suffering and calamity. Terrible things really do happen. A lot of people have suffered cruelties beyond our imagination, and then we also hear a lot about the effect of violence-as-entertainment on children and adults. Our perception of the world is shaped by the media we access. Our behavior, in turn, is shaped by our perception. If many of us expect violence to break out at any moment, donʼt we increase the energy available for that to occur? The monster is the symbol of what we have to fear.

segunda-feira, 19 de abril de 2010

マルサの女 OST - Toshiyuki Honda

A Taxing Woman
Directed by: Juzo Itami
1987

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domingo, 18 de abril de 2010

Modes of Social Critique in the Film Work of Yanagimachi Mitsuo

(Jukyusai no Chizu, 1979)
By Joel Neville Anderson

Critic Doug Cummings, of FilmJourney.com, praises Yanagimachi for his “renowned tendency to describe rather than ascribe,” which “keeps the film’s enigmas and nuances alive, waiting to be plundered.” He quotes the director as saying of his next film: “The movie is a portrayal of reality,” “I had no intention to protest or praise.”Cummings and Yanagimachi’s words touch on one of the most important aspects of his work, the sort of “perfor­mative reality” that he creates. The circus acts of the Taiwanese peddlers and the long landscape shots in Himatsuri set to Takemitsu Toru’s haunting score come together here. Sato Ikuya describes the desires of the bosozoku in terms of the street as a “stage”, the route as a “script”, and their tokkofuku uniforms as their “costumes”. He emphasizes the importance of play in the bikers’ theatrics, “trying to embody what he calls the ‘Saturday night hero.’ In Emperor, Yanagimachi’s perfor­mative incli­nations mesh well with those of the bosozoku and his unique aesthetic may be seen in its early formation. Within short interludes set to psychedelic Japanese rock, there are moments in Emperor that seem quite obviously to have come about by Yanagimachi saying, “Here, do this in front of my camera,” or, “Wait, don’t stop until I can film that.”

(read the whole article here)

terça-feira, 13 de abril de 2010

Obscenity, Pornography, and the Law in Japan: Reconsidering Oshima’s In the Realm of the Senses

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

By James R. Alexander*

I. INTRODUCTION

The question of whether government can regulate or censor media portrayals of sexuality and violence involves two fundamental issues. The first is evidentiary—whether there is a causal relationship between exposure to media portrayals of sexuality and violence and subsequent behavior in society sufficient to warrant regulation of that content in the interest of maintaining social order and tranquility. In essence, this is a question of whether exposure to sexual or violent behavior in the media encourages some members of the public to believe that such behavior is commonplace and, particularly in the case of violence, an acceptable means of mediating social relationships and therefore acceptable behavior. Also at issue here is whether media portrayals of sexuality and violence in some manner advocate or entice illegal behavior or instruct some members of the public in how to engage in such behaviors.1
The second issue is constitutional—whether government can regulate the sexual and violent content of media without contravening constitutional guarantees of free expression. In essence, this is a question of whether the expression (sexual or violent portrayals in the media) can reasonably be seen as creating an imminent threat to social order.2
In practice, government regulation tends to operate under stricter constitutional constraints when attempting to regulate expression, while being accorded greater latitude in regulating circumstances where regulation of expression may be warranted.3
It is in this latter category (the regulation of circumstances) that judicial doctrine usually comes to accept certain “areas of exception” to absolute constitutional protections of expression, such as when civil disorder is purposely being provoked,4 an individual’s livelihood or reputation may be compromised,5 or the expression is considered to contribute little to public discourse.6 In each, doctrinal sliding scales or “degrees of protection” expectedly emerge as the content of expression includes elements of both protected and “less protected” areas of expression.7 In the 19th century, statutory regulation of obscenity in many industrial societies encompassed a wide range of types of expression, including but not limited to topics of a sexual nature.8 However, since that time, the term (and thereby regulation of) “obscenity” has, in practice, been confined to topics related to sex and more specifically those portrayals considered to purposely appeal to prurient interest and enticing some members of the public toward inappropriate (albeit not necessarily criminal) behavior.9
Violent expression has traditionally been treated differently from sexual expression, the latter having more immediately moral overtones. Portrayals of violence in the media therefore have tended to defy categorization under free expression guarantees, and can either be considered a separate category of expression warranting a constitutional “exception” from those guarantees or as a subcategory of obscene expression, an area of expression already treated in most societies as an “area of exception” from those guarantees.10 The latter course would assume that society assesses the potential for anti-social behavior resulting from exposure to violent expression with similar levels of probability as the potential anti-social behavior we presume would be induced by exposure to obscenity.11 Inclusion of violent expression as a constitutional subcategory of the unprotected area of obscenity would indicate a retrogression toward the broader, early 19th century constitutional definition of obscenity (beyond its current narrower focus on sexual topics), arguing in effect that both sexual and violent expression are equally capable of enticing unwanted social behavior and therefore warrant regulation in the interest of protecting the public welfare.
The purpose of this essay is not to review judicial doctrine or case law in the area of obscenity, though the origins and applications of obscenity as an “area of exception” are clearly germane, particularly if we are to include violent expression in that category. Furthermore, my purpose is not to delve into the actual and potential applications of psychoanalytical and sociological research regarding the relationship between obscene or violent expression and consequent anti-social behavior, although that causal relationship is also clearly germane to the regulation of either type of expression. Rather, this essay is more narrowly focused, seeking in a purely illustrative manner to explore several of these issues from the perspective of how a society other than the United States—Japan—attempts to mediate its notions of individual rights of expression, in particular expressions considered obscene and/or violent, with demands of the greater public welfare.
Our point of departure is the censorship trial of Nagisa Oshima,12 a Japanese filmmaker who was indicted on obscenity charges related to his 1976 film In the Realm of the Senses (Ai no koriida13). While the film presents controversial themes and graphic images that intricately connect elements of violence with sexual behavior, cinematic interpretations and subsequent legal consideration of Oshima’s film have focused almost entirely on the degree to which it broke new ground for sexual explicitness.14 While such treatment may well have suited Oshima’s aspiration to uniqueness, interpretation of the content and effect of the film cannot be extricated completely from its cultural context. When the film is placed in the context of Japanese culture and law at the time it was released, an enlightened perspective is gained on how a society, in its protection of what it determines to be its public welfare, uses law to regulate the content of expression (sexual and otherwise) while continuing to place primary value on the freedom of expression.

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

II. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA IN JAPAN

The re-release of the full, uncut version of Oshima’s In the Realm of the Senses several years ago attracted scant attention in Japan other than from cinema critics who remember the international publicity surrounding the film’s initial release at the Cannes Film Festival in Paris and the obscenity trial that followed in Japan several years later. Oshima, a leading Japanese New Wave filmmaker in the 1960s, was prosecuted on obscenity charges stemming from publication of a trade book of still photographs and script notes from the film. After a very public trial, Oshima was acquitted in 1982.15
Within the film industry, In the Realm of the Senses attained cult status as the first production for mainstream commercial distribution to include explicit or hardcore sex scenes. Due to restrictive censorship laws in Japan, Oshima directed the production on a closed set, developed and edited the film in France, and only showed the film in countries without censorship laws. The film was later shown in Japan with forty-nine objectionable scenes—close to one-third of the film—cut out or airbrushed. The recently re-released version of Oshima’s film restores all of the edited scenes but digitally scrambles images of genitalia. The film, even in its restored version, is hardly graphic by contemporary standards. However, its re-release affords an opportunity to reflect on how and why Japan and other societies develop and enforce standards on obscenity.

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

III. CENSORSHIP IN JAPANESE MEDIA

Historically, government officials in Japan have been accorded and have exercised much broader administrative discretion in regulating the content of film than their counterparts in some western societies, notably the United States. Japanese courts, however, have developed and used definitions of obscenity similar to those found in other societies. It is instructive to explore the application of obscenity law in Japan’s unique cultural and political circumstances.
Entertainment media in Japan is well known for sexual and violent content, particularly in film, cartoons (anime), comics (manga), and video games. In the early 1970s, the Japanese film industry engaged in the wide-scale production and public distribution of violent (“gangster” or yakuza) and “soft core” (pink or pinku eiga) films, the latter emphasizing the nudity and the rape and torture of young girls. Without stretching the point too far, if we assume there is a general relationship between increased sexuality and violence in media and subsequent patterns of social behavior, we might expect to find increased levels of sexual violence in Japanese society. But this did not occur,16 raising the broader issue of the role of censorship in Japan.
In Japan, there has been a history of governmental scrutiny of public portrayals of a number of topics, such as those considered integral to the maintenance of national identity, pride, and values. Respectful treatment of government officials and policy, the family, and religion was expected, and critical treatment of these topics in a public venue was often considered a threat to traditional social norms and societal stability in general.17 As a matter of public policy, public discussion or portrayal of topics considered integral to social stability and the maintenance of national values was considered appropriate only if it was respectful and reinforced mainstream cultural and political values. Particularly from the mid-19th century, following adoption of European notions of inherent state administrative rights, government officials in Japan were not only empowered to control such portrayals through enforcement of existing laws, but were also expected to maintain general order and protect social welfare by enforcing a common sense of public decorum covering everything from individual manners and morals to public dignity and respect for national institutions and customs.18 Official actions were often justified on public health grounds and, in particular, the development and upbringing of children.19
The slow adoption of notions of private or individual rights culminated in the promulgation of Articles 19 through 23 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution.20 These rights and freedoms of the spirit, however, were considered integral only within the context of the needs of the greater community. Individuals were prohibited from exercising those rights in an abusive manner, i.e., at the expense of the public welfare.21 Mindful of the constitutional guarantee under Article 21 that “no censorship shall be maintained,” government authorities typically used public hygiene laws to restrict the sale and distribution of obscene materials under Article 175 of the revised 1907 Criminal Code, which specified that:

"A person who distributes or sells an obscene writing, picture, or other object or who publicly displays the same, shall be punished with imprisonment... or a fine. The same applies to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale.22"

Under enforcement of Article 175 of the Criminal Code, obscenity displayed in any form could not be sold, loaned, or passed to the public in any fashion for any reason.23 Furthermore, obscene material could not be shown to any member of the public, whether alone or in a group.
Neither government administrators nor the courts were legally compelled to specify what constituted “obscene” material and how it offended public decorum, since their authority in this realm was subsumed under their general responsibilities to protect the public welfare in ways they deemed appropriate.24 However, a discernable pattern of legal enforcement identified those areas considered objectionable and inappropriate for public discourse. As noted, this pattern tended to mirror western definitions of obscenity. Japanese officials had tried to emulate as closely as possible European and American standards as part of an effort to reestablish Japanese sovereignty and make Japan a more acceptable international trading partner with western industrialized nations.
For example, precedent-setting obscenity cases in Japan in the 1950s focused on the importation of classical (and sexually provocative) western literature. The foundation for the current Japanese judicial doctrine of obscenity was developed in response to translation and distribution of D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, which itself had precipitated obscenity standards in Britain and the United States during the same period.25 In Koyama v. Japan, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that a work could be judged “obscene” under Article 175 if it aroused and stimulated sexual desire, offended a common sense of modesty or shame, and violated “proper concepts of sexual morality.”26 By this ruling, the Court assumed final responsibility for articulating and protecting the appropriate standard of social morality in society, without particular reference to changing interests or tastes in society.27
Subsequent decisions refined the Koyama definition, responding to questions of whether any one transgression within a work irretrievably “taints” the whole work,28 whether more latitude ought to be accorded works of artistic or literary nature,29 and more broadly, whether censorship in the name of public welfare violates the right of free expression.30 To date, the rulings of the Japanese courts have been quite consistent in confirming the policy that protection of the public welfare through censorship of obscenity is not a violation of free expression guarantees, but rather is integral to the maintenance of a stable society in which those guarantees have substantive meaning.31
Japanese attempts to adopt and apply western standards of obscenity to foreign film proved more difficult because of the complexities of deciphering objectionable content due to variances in language translations and/or differences in the cultural context providing the setting for the piece. For example, an “art film” cast in a French setting, reflecting French (rather than Japanese) cultural values, and expressed in the nuances of the French language, would be difficult for Japanese officials to edit without totally losing the “artistic meaning” of the film.32 In most cases, therefore, foreign films were not censored or edited on grounds of objectionable story line content. Instead, enforcement was often reduced to considerations of objectionable visual depictions, particularly those related to sexual topics. While there were instances of leniency in some sexual depictions, perhaps due in part to traditional social acceptance in Japan of “non-sexual” nudity in some public contexts,33 most displays of the genital area or pubic hair of either sex in film were considered automatic violations of decorum and subject to local indictment.34 Following the pattern of several western societies, notably France and the United States, there was a gradual acceptance of more explicit nudity in Japanese filmmaking during the 1960s with the emergence of the pinku eiga genre, in which female nakedness of the torso and buttocks was common. Depictions of the genital areas however were still strictly prohibited and either framed out by filmmakers (so as to not become an issue under local obscenity laws) or subject to blackout, airbrushing, or image scrambling. When American filmmaking moved in an explicitly hard-core direction in the late 1960s, thereby splitting the public audience into mainstream and X-rated markets, Japanese filmmakers did not, and could not, follow because of the strict enforcement of restrictions placed on films shown in public. Unable to include more explicit sexuality and in fear of losing market share, Japanese filmmakers at that point began to combine permissible depictions of sexuality with ever-more-graphic images of violence and sadomasochism.35

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

IV. CENSORSHIP OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FILMS

Enforcement of Japanese obscenity laws has primarily been the responsibility of local law enforcement, together with the Customs Bureau (regarding imports), and a self-governing regulatory commission composed initially of the top six major motion picture companies. The Customs Bureau is empowered to review and grant approval to imported products, including film, under Article 21 of the Customs Standards Law of 1910, and to restrict or censor those products “considered of such a nature as to excite sexual desire and give rise in people to feelings of shame or repugnance.”36
Since World War II, Customs Bureau censorship under this standard involved strict cutting out or blurring of all offending frames prior to approval for domestic viewing. In many cases, imported films were so mutilated or blurred as to make no sense to audiences at all. But by the 1980s, Customs practices of censoring films had eased, particularly as imports of foreign film were progressively adjudged to have “serious artistic content,” i.e., containing sexual depictions not designed to arouse sexual desire or not likely to actually produce arousal based on how images were portrayed.37
The self-governing Film Ethics Sustaining Committee (Eirin Iji Inkai, hereinafter Eirin) was established in 1949 as self-regulatory review body responsible for enforcing the self-imposed Motion Picture Ethics Code adopted in that year.38 In response to what was perceived as its excessive leniency toward films portraying juvenile violence and latent social criticism (youth films or taiyozoku), Eirin was reorganized in 1957 to include members from outside the industry, successfully avoiding direct government regulation of the industry.
Eirin was responsible for reviewing and approving domestic films at various stages of production, including during script writing, and certifying they were in compliance with the Code developed by that body and were approved for showing in theaters of the Theater Owners Association, most of which were owned by or in contractual agreement with the six major motion picture companies.39 Under the authority of the Healthy Environmental Law of 1957, domestic films without Eirin approval could not by law be distributed or shown in Japan.40 In practice, film producers framed around those types of visual depictions they anticipated Eirin would find sufficiently objectionable to deny certification until appropriate masking or editing had been completed.41
Assessment of whether a domestic or foreign film violated obscenity laws was generally based on consideration of both story line content and visual explicitness, although foreign films were treated in a somewhat more lenient fashion and were scrutinized more on their explicitness than on their content.42 After initial consideration of a film’s content, officials made recommendations for the editing of offending or potentially offending scenes, which could then be satisfied by the director through editorial cuts or visual masking.43 Eventually, a mediated standard for domestic film production emerged by which masking would automatically be applied during production to scenes assumed vulnerable to Eirin censorship, even before Eirin officials viewed the film.44
An imported film passed by Customs was automatically licensed for public showing without Eirin consideration. Initially, the less explicit domestic roman pornu films were insulated from import competition by Custom’s practice of radical cutting or masking of more explicit foreign films to the point that they became incomprehensible or unrecognizable.45 However, as Customs granted imported films more latitude in both content and explicitness, the market for film consumption in Japan became bifurcated, with domestic films governed internally by film producers through Eirin, and more explicit foreign films approved for domestic showing by Customs.46 This pressured domestic filmmakers to ease their self-imposed standards in order to compete with foreign films for a consuming public that wanted to see more explicit and challenging films.
As the market contained imported products of more explicit nature and domestic products still mired in “softer” core standards, domestic filmmakers began to lose market share in the 1980s and strained the self-imposed boundaries of Eirin toleration with increased sexual and violent explicitness.47 As a countermeasure, Eirin (which had by that time become more independent of the remaining four major film producing companies) demanded less provocative public advertising of both domestic and imported films, particularly those blatantly involving sex with and violence toward young girls, and an accord was reached in 1984 tempering of graphicness of public advertising for pinku eiga.48
By that time, however, the pervasiveness of color television in the home and the expanding adult manga home video market had already significantly undermined market demand for pinku eiga. Public theater admissions had peaked in 1958 and declined precipitously after that, losing almost ninety percent of its 1958 audience share by 1995.49 With increased competition from independent studios, the relaxation of restrictions on film imports, and the decline in theater attendance in general, the number of domestic films produced in Japan dropped from 545 in 1960, a market share of 78% in 7,457 theaters, to 281 in 2001, a market share of 44% in 2,558 theaters.50 By 1980, two of the five mainstream studios had closed and Nikkatsu, arguably the first and one of the most innovative major studios in the earlier period of Japanese filmmaking and which had shifted most of its production to pinku eiga by the early 1970s to stay solvent, closed in 1988.51

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

V. OSHIMA’S IN THE REALM OF THE SENSES

There is no doubt that Oshima intended In the Realm of the Senses to be pornographic.52 And it is clearly obscene, at least in those scenes that contain explicit and visceral images of male and female genitalia, coitus, and fellatio. The film would not have passed uncensored for domestic showing in Japan. The indictment of Oshima for obscenity violations under Article 175, however, was based on the publication of a trade book of limited printing containing still photos from the film and script notes. While Oshima was eventually acquitted, the greater and more public issue was whether the book was being challenged under Article 175 as a surrogate for the film itself, which at that time had not been presented to Customs for review as an imported film and had not even been shown in Japan. Oshima’s demand that prosecutors specify what was and what was not obscene provides a useful starting point for us to consider some of the more challenging and complex issues raised by the film, even though the film itself never directly became subject to court review.
Oshima’s film is comprised of a series of vignettes, each portraying an ordinary life circumstance that becomes transformed into a sexual encounter of some kind, leading the audience to the conclusion that all behavioral modes have sexual undertones that, if unrestrained by social mores, become obsessive and obscene. Each successive vignette represents an escalation in the level of obsession, to the point that the principals are unable to retreat to safer (norm-based) behaviors. Instead they push the boundaries of sexual exploration into areas society would consider deviant and taboo, and certainly not appropriate for public display or discourse.53 In this manner, Oshima is purposely transgressive—confronting the audience with representations of unmitigated sexual appetite at the expense of social decorum and common cleanliness, the primitive aggressiveness of female sexuality, the rejection of the rational and prescribed social roles, the transformative qualities of violence in sexuality, and the fleeting nature of youth—common themes developed in Japanese New Wave cinema.54 By so doing, Oshima purposely traps the audience into watching Sada and Kichi explore sexual avenues in private that many in the audience in the 1970s may have never experienced, or even considered, much less seen in film.55 While other Japanese directors usually adhered to accepted decorum as established by censorship standards and left those sights or sounds to the imagination, Oshima denies the audience nothing. He actually frames and lingers on the most forbidden elements of sexual explicitness, and the audience begins to anticipate the destructive direction that the protagonists’ relationship is headed but is helpless to intervene.
Oshima’s framing directly exposes the audience to the jeopardy of straying outside established social norms and being lured into the more primitive, obsessive, exploratory, and violent behaviors that characterize Sada’s futile, even nihilistic pursuit of sexual exhilaration. At some point the audience has to wonder if there actually is a sustainable relationship, much less a sexual relationship, between Sada and Kichi, since there appears to be no compassionate affection. At least on the surface, what the audience sees is an elaborate role-play, with Kichi initially playing the aggressor, conquering his servant, Sada, and converting her into his personal ersatz geisha. Gradually the roles reverse, with Sada becoming the constant aggressor and Kichi the submissive, complying with her every demand to the point that their sexual ministrations become ritualistic, almost tedious. As her sexual demands reach his physiological limits, they begin using violence—first hitting, then choking—as a means of sustaining him, and ultimately killing him.
While Sada does transform from a responsive instrument of Kichi’s sexual satisfaction to a realization of her own independent need, there is a real question as to whether her need is sexual at all, and whether the film is in fact pornographic. Oshima frames the film in graphic sexual images, enticing his audience to believe that the couple seeks ultimate meaning in Sada’s everlasting orgasm. But in doing so, the director leaves viewers wondering whether, if the graphic sexuality were peeled away, a deeper madness, or even nihilistic meaninglessness would be revealed.

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)


VI. IS OSHIMA’S FILM OBSCENE ... OR EVEN PORNOGRAPHIC?

The circumstances of the Oshima obscenity trial reveal both constants and variations in the methods by which societies define and enforce obscenity standards. Societies traditionally judge obscene that which affronts accepted social values and transgresses what is common and expected. Obscene matter usually includes topics that are, by public decorum standards, considered private, intimate concerns, not appropriate for public discourse or display. The definition of what is obscene is often determined by a public consensus, a general common understanding as to what should be kept to one’s own and not displayed or spoken of in the presence of others.
Such a consensus evolves over time, solidified through social convention and enforcement of laws based on accepted social mores. If a society values free expression as critical to both political and cultural democratization, it must continually redefine the boundaries of acceptable public discourse by mediating the inevitable tension between creative impulse, social commentary, and political dissent on the one hand and legal maintenance of social norms on the other.
Transgressions of social mores are shocking to the public consciousness because they intrude on the expected level of public quietude and are considered offensive or even repulsive. The intensity of public response to those transgressions is often in proportion to the public’s relative unfamiliarity in public discourse.56 An intuitive level of revulsion may, however, ease over time as the objects of revulsion, such as graphic depictions of sexuality or sexual violence, appear more commonly in public discourse. While obscenity in many societies is generally equated with sexuality, social revulsion is not always reserved only for sexual expression but often extends to topics related to other personal intimacies or controversial social, cultural, or political issues.
In what context then can we assess whether Oshima’s In the Realm of the Senses is sufficiently shocking to be classified as obscene and warrant censorship? First, we must remember that while Oshima wanted to stretch the boundaries of cinematic acceptability in Japan (as he had since 1959), he intended the film for foreign distribution and showing, i.e., in societies with more fluid boundaries of acceptable sexual imagery.57 That the film in effect became subject to the constraining standards of Japanese obscenity law was unintended. And while the film itself was never subject to legal scrutiny in Japan, it subsequently passed Customs in the late 1970s only after significant editing and airbrushing.
In the Realm of the Senses presents sufficiently visceral images of male and female genitalia, fellatio, and coitus to trigger Customs censorship. The film also portrays the principals in what an audience might consider to be disturbing social behavior. In a society we assume to be controlled by social obligation, Kichi abandons his family and occupational responsibilities to engage in prolonged and purely hedonistic indulgences, resulting in a willful form of suicide. In a society we assume to be governed by communal conventions, Kichi and Sada abandon and even publicly flaunt any consideration of public decorum and cleanliness. In a society we assume to be paternalistic, Kichi becomes dominated by and subservient to Sada’s every whim. If social norms define the range of acceptable public behavior as well as discourse, has not Oshima crossed the line in any one of these content areas sufficient to shock and disgust the general audience?
Maybe. But we must be careful not to impose our own values of what is acceptable public behavior or discourse, or too quickly apply what we believe to be prevailing norms in Japan. Historically, Japanese society has a long heritage of publicly accepted erotica and pornographic representation that only became ostensibly less acceptable during the Meiji Restoration when Japan was seeking broader cultural acceptance by western industrial societies. The same can be said of Japan’s traditional acceptance of nudity in some public contexts.58 While public portrayal of sexuality may be officially governed by more recently adopted (and perhaps more discrete) western standards, Oshima’s inclusion of total nudity, even intimate nude embraces, may not be inconsistent with the norms of Japanese society.59 And Oshima’s exploration of obsessive, almost nihilistic sexual relationships is certainly not new, but rather a predominant theme of many of the New Wave productions of the 1960s.60 Finally, that Sada should so easily be able to subvert Kichi’s sense of social obligation, to the point of his own death, may be consistent not only with earlier film portrayals in the New Wave but also with common eros/thanatos themes in Japanese folklore regarding demonic aspects of the female sexuality.61
Along thematic lines, then, Japanese audiences of the 1970s may have considered an uncut version of Oshima’s film more vulgar and repugnant than shocking or disquieting. Explicit scenes of coitus, consensual or forced, may easily be specified as obscene simply because that was the standard enforced by government officials and the courts, by Eirin in its film certification process, and by domestic producers and directors making editing decisions to avoid those images.
What may be more difficult to determine is whether the explicit scenes would be considered obscene merely because they are too explicit, or because they are explicit and pornographic. If the applied standard is based on explicitness alone, the question becomes at what point images are so explicit that they affront public decorum, a scale that clearly changes over time with gradual public acceptance or familiarity. If the applied standard requires a synergy between explicitness and an underlying ideology—pornographic images being those designed to stimulate sexual interest—then the audience plays a more active role in interpreting the interaction of images and words, a role tempered by its own expectations, the director’s presentation of common frames of reference, and the nature of the medium itself.62
If the audience is comfortable with the traditional pornographic frame of reference, with visual imagery that conforms to social expectations if not consensual norms, then the images themselves need not be very explicit for a pornographic effect to be elicited. When the construct of sexual images also contains elements of violence, as in Oshima’s film, where violence is portrayed as consensual and enhancing sexual stimulation, the audience may interpret the images differently, perhaps not in an erotic way.63 In all of these cases, we are compelled not so much by the director’s intent, but by our assessment of the degree to which the audience is actually sexually aroused.64 Effective pornography, one might argue, does not need to be very explicit.65
But the issue raised by this construct is more complex. Why a very structured society such as Japan would accept continuous portrayals of sadomasochistic sexuality and sexual violence toward women in film (and other entertainment media) is a provocative and perplexing question. Analysts have argued that Japan has gone through several periods in which its national identity was questioned, rethought and reconstituted, most recently in the twenty-year period following World War II.66 During that period, the Japanese New Wave film genre emerged, challenging the entire spectrum of traditional societal values and in many ways converting entertainment media into avenues of escapism.67
The question remains how a society that seems to revere women in performance of traditional roles has generally come to accept as a dominant construct of its entertainment media the exploitation of female sexuality and in particular the continuous sexual violation of them (particularly in films), and yet still exhibits fairly low levels of violence toward women in real life. One interpretation is that, as the traditionally compartmentalized structure of female gender roles in Japanese society was breaking down, women who maintained their traditional duties of nurturing children, stewarding their education, and maintaining the household were still revered as long as they remain within that construct.68 Women become vulnerable to other less reverential constructions if they either had not yet entered into those traditional roles (such as young schoolgirls) or had stepped outside them (such as working or professional women). It is schoolgirls and professional women that are the prevalent objects of rape and other forms of violence in Japanese films.69
To assume that the sheer visibility of explicit sexual images is stimulative and therefore pornographic is too simplistic. The images cannot be taken out of the framed construct of the film, since it is from that construct that the audience is able to interpret them.70 For example, male initiated and dominated coitus, such as Kichi’s initial predatory pursuit of Sada, his indifferent treatment of his wife, and his episodic rape of various household servants, may actually conform to traditional audience expectations of gender roles in society as a whole. Though members of the audience may not agree with or support such role differentiation, they may nonetheless accept the film’s depiction as a familiar representation. On the other hand, female initiated and dominated coitus (Sada’s control of her relationship with Kichi), or other acts of female-initiated sexuality, (Sada’s initiation of violence into her relationship with the schoolmaster or he sexual initiation of the young geisha after Sada and Kichi’s mock wedding), might be unexpected and considered inconsistent with generally accepted gender roles, and simply too confusing and “unreal” to be stimulative.71
That Kichi might become Sada’s submissive supplicant is not an entirely unfamiliar role construct in Japanese theater or film. In traditional theater, the dominant male lead adopts and unwaveringly maintains a noble and indifferent posture toward women while the passive, weak male second lead adopts an empathetic (quasi-romantic) and self-sacrificing posture toward women.72 Kichi, however, adopts both roles. He accepts the role of self-sacrificing servant to Sada’s sexual impulse while retaining his dominant posture toward other women in his household, thereby allowing the audience to maintain some recognition of the dominant male role in sexual relations, albeit in the form of raping his servants when they exhibit disrespect.
In this, Oshima visualizes Kichi’s sexual behavior purely in terms of re-establishing social dominance, probably a relatively unattractive and unstimulating portrayal to many in contemporary Japan. That the traditionally dominant Kichi can at the same time become totally compliant to Sada’s whims raises the specter of a recurring theme in Japanese folklore—that of the demon-woman who uses her irresistible sexual charms to lure man to his eventual and willful destruction.73
At the risk of interposing Eurocentric notions, the sexual relationship between Sada and Kichi is neither passionate nor romantic. Initially, their sexuality is played out as the vehicle of his predatory conquest. When he then becomes addicted to their sexual relations, their sexuality becomes a vehicle of his fatalistic pursuit of his youth and her obsession with status and possession. In short, despite the sexual explicitness of the various scenes, their relationship is hardly “sexy” or alluring. On the contrary, one might argue that the obsessive tedium of their sexual activities reveals an affective emptiness that itself seems vulgar. While Oshima provides us with a few recognizable images of conventional sexuality, contextually necessary to be classified as obscene, he systematically denies us the ability to escape into more traditionally comfortable sexual fantasy (that might be classified as pornographic) by suffocating us with boorishly constant and graphic sexual incidents and playing out the principals’ roles to an apparently meaningless and pathetic end.74

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)

VII. CONCLUSION

Clearly, as in most precedent cases in Japan, the legal scrutiny of Oshima’s In the Realm of the Senses focused entirely on whether the film’s images of sexuality were too explicit for public showing in Japan.75 Understandably, Oshima demanded that the court explain that standard —philosophically, politically, conceptually, and visually—before it was applied to his or any other film subject to government censorship.76 Specifically, he wanted the court to identify exactly what elements comprise the “explicitness” of an image—its graphicness? Its detail? Its context? Its implied values? The court would not say.
Had benchmarking elements been offered, we would then be forced to gauge whether a particular image could be considered excessively explicit. Might an image be too explicit for public viewing because it shocks those in the audience? Because it causes public embarrassment or shame? Because it causes personal revulsion or disgust? How are we to measure these inherently subjective conclusions for individuals, much less an entire audience that in all likelihood has widely varying expectations of what constitutes public fare?77 The only answer can be that these judgments are by nature individual, and while an intuitive consensus regarding public decorum may be breaking down in many post-industrial societies, there remain basic judgments to be made regarding how public discourse affects the broader social welfare. The question becomes—to whom falls the responsibility of making that judgment on behalf of all in society?
As a society, Japan has traditionally accepted and adhered to the notion that social welfare concerns preempt individual preferences. The Japanese courts have accepted and supported constitutional notions of individual rights defined primarily as matters of mutual respect, i.e., within the broader context of communal welfare. This is consistent with the practice in many other industrial/post-industrial societies other than the United States, which assumes that the individual has an inviolable right of expression—in all areas of expression—unless or until the government can demonstrate a compelling social welfare justification for constraining that right.78
In Japan, however, the regulation of individual behavior is already accepted as an appropriate responsibility of government officials and court judges.79 This issue is not argued on a case-by-case basis. Individual expression rights have always subject to constraint by legislation, and there has historically been broad societal acceptance and adherence to this goal. Obscenity law as applied by judges, not individual members of the public, continues to be the measure by which a traditional sense of public decorum is maintained. And that sense of decorum is considered societal rather than individual.
In this process, there is no legal or ideological presumption that specific anti-social or criminal behavior is associated with the consumption of obscenity. To a certain degree, there is a broad legal acceptance that sexuality and violence are a part of one’s normal social experience, and that citizens, even young people, might be exposed to materials portraying sexuality and violence as long as those portrayals are not so explicit that they violate a sense of public decorum as benchmarked in previous court decisions. In Japanese law, then, obscenity is defined in terms of the explicitness of visual images rather than anticipations of aberrant behavioral consequences. This is a reflection of Japan’s underlying ideological commitment to stable social norms. While In the Realm of the Senses was a path-breaking and provocative film in many respects, it will always be considered obscene, though hardly pornographic, under Japanese law.

(Ai no Corrida, 1976)


Notes:
* PhD, University of Colorado; Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges suggestions from Lawrence Beer, Aaron Gerow, Keiko McDonald, Alan McKee, Mark Nornes, Katherine Reist, and Hideo Shimizu, while retaining full responsibility for the result.
1 In American jurisprudence, this “incitement doctrine” comes from Brandenburg vs. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978) (arguing that content-based regulation of television is unconstitutional); Stephen Kim, Comment, “Viewer Discretion Advised”: A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1994); Dana Fraytak, Article, The Influence of Pornography on Rape and Violence Against Women: A Social Science Approach, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 263 (2000/2001) (addressing arguments that media portrayals of rape and violence incite behavior); Christine H. Hansen and Ranald D. Hansen, Rock Music Videos and Antisocial Behavior, 11 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 357 (1990); and Testimony of Henry Jenkins on Media Violence before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee (1999) (statement of Henry Jenkins, Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Comparative Media Studies Program), available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/0504jen3.pdf.
2 See Harry Kalvin, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191 (1964); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209 (1994).
3 Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A Defense of Content-Based Regulation of Violent Expression, 62 ALB. L. REV. 183 (1998). See also Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 113 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
4 See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement that Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207 (1999); Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (1993); Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1988).
5 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990); Jerome K. Skolnick, The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 677 (1986) (discussing libel, slander, defamation, and “hurtful speech”).
6 The range of speech deemed “not contributing to public discourse” can be quite subjective, and as first enunciated in American jurisprudence in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), obscenity is one area that is considered non-contributory by definition and not protected by First Amendment free speech guarantees. For the range of subjectivity within the “obscenity exception” in American law, see generally David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1994); Paul Kearns, Obscenity Law and the Creative Writer: The Case of D.H. Lawrence, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 525 (1998); Daniel Mach, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and the First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1997); Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990).
7 Sliding scales most often take into consideration the content of the material and its mode of expression, the nature of the intended and unintended audience of the expression, and the projected immediate (or even long- term) effect on the subsequent behavior of those in the audience. See generally Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fighting the Fighting Words Standard: A Call for Its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (2000); Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195 (2001); Cheryl B. Preston, Consuming Sexism: Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Commercial Values, 31 GA. L. REV. 771 (1997); Amy Tridgell, Newsgathering and Child Pornography Research; The Case of Lawrence Charles Matthews, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 343 (2000); and discussion infra note 8.
8 Outrageous, blasphemous, slanderous, or vulgar utterances, spoken or published in public, were generally considered obscene based on a common law consensus regarding appropriate public topics and modes of expression enforced by magistrates who represented the general public. Central to the development of early American obscenity law was the English case of Queen v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868) (Cockburn, C.J.). In Hicklin, a pamphlet challenging Catholic practice also contained descriptions of “impure and filthy acts, words and ideas” that, despite the possibility of decent intention, were deemed obscene because their “tendency . . . [was] to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. . . . [I]t is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.” Id. at 369-73. From this holding sprang two important precepts of Anglo-American obscenity law. First, Hicklin inaugurated “the most susceptible mind” judicial doctrine which anticipates the effect of obscene materials on public morality. Application of this doctrine is now largely abandoned except in the area of child pornography. Second, Hicklin established the role of the magistrate (rather than the jury) in enforcing the “appropriate sense” of public morality. This analytical structure has devolved into an awkward judicial anticipation of whether the materials in question appeal inappropriately to prurient interest of the “average person” and whether there may be an overriding public benefit (“redeeming social value”) to the distribution of those materials. The determination of the former, after Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), became an exercise in establishing “local standards” while the latter became a debate over the contributory value of creative expression to democratic discourse, art, literature, film, and music. The effort to establish a relevant “community” became vastly more complicated by pervasive public access to the internet, as described by Professor Clay Calvert. Clay Calvert, Regulating Sexual Images on the Web: Last Call for Miller Time, But New Issues Remain Untapped, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 507 (2001).
9 As a basic definition, erotic representations are those related to sexual activity, intended to be celebratory, formal, figurative, informational, or stimulating. Erotic representations that stimulate and are intended to arouse sexual interest are considered pornographic. Pornographic representations that contravene prevailing social norms, as defined by convention or law, would be considered obscene. See generally RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 37-69 (1992); ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF RETICENCE: AMERICA’S CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE SPEECH, OBSCENITY, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART 179-212 (1996) (describing how these definitions are reflected in the law); KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING THE MEDIA’S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 63-134 (1996) (analyzing connections to sexual violence).
10 The question of whether violent images in the media precipitate or incite behavior, or even eventually desensitize individuals from social norms that generally preclude such behavior, opens the more controversial topic of regulating expression simply because it is vulgar, unpopular, or shocking. Areas of expression are traditionally protected unless a direct relationship between the expression and subsequent behavior can be demonstrated or reasonably inferred. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, The Enticing Images Doctrine: An Emerging Principle in First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 595 (2000); John Charles Kunich, Natural Born Copycat Killers and the Law of Shock Torts, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1157 (2000); Richard Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 3 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2000); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, Perverse Law]; Robert Firester & Kendall Jones, Catchin’ the Heat of the Beat: First Amendment Analysis of Music Claimed to Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2000).
11 The existence of an integrated societal connection between sexual violence (ranging from sex crimes to simply violence against female victims) and pornography was effectively drawn by the work of Catharine A. MacKinnon and others in the 1980s. MacKinnon argues that pornography supports a dominant-value construct in American society that undervalues women and thereby encourages violence toward them. MacKinnon’s thesis sparked considerable debate over her basic premises, her identification of the types of images that support the dominant construct, correlations between pornography consumption and criminal behavior, and potential tort liability. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). See generally Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 460 (1984); DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1989). While the courts have never fully accepted the connection between pornography and sexual violence to warrant systematic reduction in free expression protection, they have almost unquestioningly accepted the existence of a direct relationship between child pornography and sex crimes against children. See, e.g., Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 10; Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment,149 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2001).
12 Oshima was not the first modern or post-war Japanese film director to be indicted on obscenity charges. The first was Tetsuji Takechi in 1965 for his film Black Snow (Kuroi Yuki). However, Oshima was arguably the most visible and most provocative of those indicted in the 1970s, particularly since his In the Realm of the Senses was explicitly pornographic beyond commercial standards of the time and had been presented and received with much critical acclaim in the Directors’ Fortnight during the 1976 Cannes Film Festival.
13 Ai no koriida literally translates into “bullfight of love,” an allegorical phrase that was changed to L’Empire des Sens (In the Realm of the Senses) when the film was released to an international audience. The film reconstructs the famous true story of Sada Abe, a maid in a Geisha house owned by Kichi-zo. The two become sexually intimate and spend two weeks indulging and experimenting with the boundaries of sexual pleasure and physical pain. Sada, at Kichi’s tacit invitation, ultimately chokes him to death during sex. In the actual 1936 account, Sada was a low-class prostitute who had strangled her lover (possibly a pimp) and severed his penis. In Oshima’s version, Sada is portrayed as a former prostitute who has just started working in Kichi’s household as a servant girl. Kichi’s occupation and family situation are much more traditional in the film, making his descent into an all-consuming relationship with Sada even more scandalous. Oshima’s sex scenes include explicit images of male and female genitalia, coitus, fellatio, and female-female rape that far exceeded what had become accepted under Japanese government censorship standards during the pinku eiga period in the 1970s. See JACK HUNTER, EROS IN HELL: SEX, BLOOD AND MADNESS IN JAPANESE CINEMA 14-25 (1999); THOMAS WEISSER & YUKO MIHARA WEISSER, JAPANESE CINEMA ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE SEX FILMS 105-112 (1998).
14 Since the 1960s, American film analysts have been struck by the explicit violence (usually rape) in Japanese films that is often directed towards women and, most often, young girls. Strong themes and portrayals of sexual violence however do not trigger Japan’s strict censorship laws unless male or female genitalia or pubic hair are visible. The issue of whether the “pornography of violence,” or exceptionally graphic violence by itself, should be subject to censorship has been raised recently in Japan with regard to two recent films: Takashi Miike’s Audition (1999) and Kinji Fukasaku’s Battle Royale (2000), the latter heralded as a “neo-Darwinist exercise in terror.” The same issue has been raised in France with regard to Virgine Despentes and Coralie Trinh Thi’s sexually violent Baise Moi (2000). To date, however, there has been an almost total absence of film censorship cases in the Japanese courts over the past two decades. This fact indicates that issue of whether explicit violence, or sexual violence without companion images of sexual explicitness, would be considered obscene and subject to regulation has been argued primarily within national film classification boards.
15 In 1979, the Tokyo District Court ruled that the publisher San’ichishobo was not guilty of publishing obscene literature. San’ichishobo Co. Inc. v. Japan, 34 Keishu 721 (Sup. Ct., G. B, Dec. 12, 1980; Tokyo Dist. Ct.,Oct. 19, 1979), as translated in the CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 1970-1990 449-450 (Lawrence Ward Beer & Hiroshi Itoh eds., 1996). While the decision was being appealed to the Tokyo High Court, prosecutors obtained a warrant and seized all additional printings of the book, a seizure challenged by the publisher on the grounds that the publications had already been ruled (by the District Court) not obscene. The Tokyo District Court however, subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, upheld the warrant, citing that the original finding on the publication was not final but still pending as on appeal, in Japan v. Oshima et al., Hanrei Jiho, No. 945 (Tokyo Dist.Ct., Jan. 11, 1980).
16 Milton Diamond & Ayako Uchiyama, Pornography, Rape, and Sex Crimes in Japan, 22 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (1999). Diamond and Uchiyama attempted to match the increased prevalence of graphic sexual material in all media in Japan with incidents of six types of sex crimes over the period 1972-1995 and found that while the population increased twenty per cent, the number of reported sex crimes remained relatively constant. Id. at 4, 9. Further, incidents involving juvenile offenders, arguably the main source of societal concern over the prevalence of graphic sexual material, actually dropped by eighty-five per cent. Id. at 10.
17 See GREGORY KASZA, THE STATE AND THE MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN 1918-1945 59-71 (1988); and KYOKO HIRANO, MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON: JAPANESE CINEMA UNDER THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION 1945-1952 47-103 (1992). The association between societal stability and respect for public policies and public officials did not emerge as an enforced concern until the 1930s and was largely characteristic of government actions only through World War II. Official concern for societal stability eroded rapidly in the postwar years as literature and film began to explore all aspects of Japanese identity. Id.
18 HIRANO, supra note 17.
19 See Lawrence Beer, Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 221 (Percy Luney & Kazuyuki Takahasi eds., 1993) [hereinafter Beer, Revolution]; JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 123 (1998); Paul Abramson & Haruo Hayashi, Pornography in Japan: Cross Cultural and Theoretical Considerations, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 173 (Neil Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984).
20 John Maki, The Constitution in Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48-52 (Percey Luney & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993); Beer, Revolution, supra note 19, at 223-224.
21 See Kawashima Takeyoshi, The Status of the Individual in the Notion of Law, Right, and Social Order in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND: ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 263 (Charles Moore ed., 1967); Beer, Revolution, supra note 19, at 223-247; Chin Kim, Constitution and Obscenity: Japan and the U.S.A.,
23 AM. J. COMP. L. 255, 264 (1975); ERIC FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY 16 (2000); Maki, supra note 20, at 48.
22 LAWRENCE WARD BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 336 (1984) [hereinafter BEER, STUDY] (citing to JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CODES I 39 (1961)).
23 KASZA, supra note 17, at 16-71. In most cases, “objects” considered obscene involved visual depictions of specific objects within a photograph, object of art, cartoon, drawing, or film, spawning a broader and more critical debate over whether, in application, the presence of one objectionable image “taints” an entire piece. Id.
24 Takeyoshi, supra note 21, at 263-271. The bureaucracy was empowered in the same manner under Article 9 of the 1889 Constitution to protect rights within the limits set by the law. Individual rights, then, could be enjoyed only within the context of restrictions placed on them, in the interest of the public welfare, by legislation, and by their levels of social obligation, mediated but not enforced by the state. Id.
25 BEER, STUDY, supra note 22, at 348-49.
26 Koyama v. Japan, 11 Keishu 997 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 13, 1957), as translated in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN—SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1948-1960 3-37 (John M. Maki ed., 1964),further maintaining that “ . . . [obscene matter] is that which wantonly stimulates or arouses sexual desire or offends the normal sense of sexual modesty of ordinary persons, and is contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality.” Id. at 7(quoting the original First Petty Bench decision). The judicial standard was to be “the good sense operating generally in society, that is, the prevailing ideas of society” which however “are not the sum of the understanding of separate individuals and are not the mean value of such understanding; they are a collective understanding that transcends both.” Id. at 9. Critical to this determination was the “sense of shame” that the court considered a visceral revulsion when sex acts, by their nature private, were brought into public view. The existence of a sense of shame was portrayed by the court as an integral aspect of basic universal morality, a morality that is enforced through law to perpetuate social order. That which is obscene has the effect of suspending one’s reasonable judgment, i.e., one’s natural revulsion, and inducing a disregard for morality, specifically sexual morality, which threatens social order. While the court recognized that “prevailing social ideas in respect to sex generally differ according to time and place . . .” and “. . . changes take place even in the same society . . .”, nevertheless “. . . there are limits that must not be overstepped and . . . norms that must be generally observed.” Id. at 10.
27 Id., reaff’d, Ishii et al v. Japan, 23 Keishu 1239 (Sup. Ct., G. B., Oct. 15, 1969), as translated in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 1970-1990 183-217 (Lawrence Beer & Hiroshi Itoh eds., 1996) [hereinafter the de Sade case]; Sato et al v. Japan, 34 Keishu 433 (Sup. Ct., 2d P. B., Nov. 28, 1980), as translated in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 1970-1990 468-471 (Lawrence Beer & Hiroshi Itoh eds., 1996); and Matsue v. Hakodate Customs Director, et al., 38 Minshu 1308 (Sup. Ct., G. B., Dec. 12, 1984), as translated in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 1970-1990 453-468 (Lawrence Beer & Hiroshi Itoh eds., 1996).
28 Basically a question of balance, this issue is more germane when applied to works of drama, art, or literature, and less germane when applied to film, from which offending scenes could more easily be cut or masked. While political expression has traditionally been accorded more latitude under the 1947 Constitution, other forms (art, literature, film) were considered “entertainment” rather than expression and routinely subject to greater administrative scrutiny, particularly under health laws. New Wave filmmakers in the 1960s purposely framed scenes containing overt sexuality and violence with political expression, making it more difficult for government officials to cut offending sections.
29 The Court has gradually accepted that artistic quality is a mitigating, but not a controlling factor, in whether a work is sufficiently obscene to warrant censorship. The outer bound in this issue was drawn in the de Sade case, in which the Tokyo District Court held that sadomasochistic passages in translations of de Sade’s Travels of Julliette were offensive and violated public decorum, yet did not engender wanton appeal to sexual passion because they were too brutal and “unreal.” De Sade case, supra note 27, at 186-187.
30 The Court has consistently ruled that the point at which society’s “sense of shame” has been transgressed by a mode of expression is “sufficiently understood” and due process does not require any further specification. Moreover, the Court has also ruled that censorship in one venue does not necessarily preclude access to other venues or other forms of similar expression. For example, in some cases of Customs censorship, the Court has ruled that censored works (works not allowed into the country) are still available to citizens should they travel abroad. See Matsue, supra note 26, at 458.
31 See BEER, STUDY, supra note 22, at 351.
32 In fact, the first foreign film to clear Customs scrutiny under these circumstances was Yasuzo Masumura’s Garden of Eden (Eden No Sono 1981), a Japanese/Italian production using Italian actors shot on location in Sardinia. In that film, Customs officials required fogging of genital areas in one sex scene but did not require fogging in another scene in which genital nudity but not sexuality was depicted. WEISSER & WEISSER, supra note 13, at 178-179. The first mainstream film imported showing pubic hair was Sally Potter’s Orlando (UK 1992), released uncensored and unmasked for domestic distribution in 1993. By the mid-1990s, in response to relaxation in censorship by both Customs and local police, the self-regulating film board in Japan (Eirin) modified the language of its operating code from “the pubic hair and sex organ should not be exposed” to “[i]n principle, the pubic hair and sex organ should not be exposed.” See WEISSER & WEISSER, supra note 13, at 31-32, and discussion infra note 35.
33 See James Downs, Nudity in Japanese Visual Media: A Cross-Cultural Observation, 19 ARCHIVES SEX. BEHAV. 583 (1990).
34 See Anne Allison, Cutting the Fringes: Pubic Hair at the Margins of Japanese Censorship Laws, in HAIR: ITS POWER AND MEANING IN ASIAN CULTURES 195 (Alf Hiltebeital & Barbara Miller eds., 1998) [hereinaftter Allison, Cutting].
35 See TADAO SATO, CURRENTS IN JAPANESE CINEMA: ESSAYS 229-232 (Gregory Barnett trans., 1982); HUNTER, supra note 13, at 10-32; and Maureen Turim, The Erotic in Asian Cinema, in DIRTY LOOKS: WOMEN, PORNOGRAPHY, POWER 83 (Pamela Church Gibson & Roma Gibson eds., 1993) [hereinafter, Turim, Erotic]. 36 BEER, STUDY, supra note 22, at 337.
37 Kim, supra note 21, at 269-270. In what perversely became know as the “pubic wars” was the groundbreaking public acceptance of Kishin Shinoyama’s Santa Fe, a 1991 photobook of popular teenage model Rie Miyazama that in several photographs revealed the model’s pubic hair. Under standard application of obscenity laws, the entire photobook would have been “tainted” by the presence of those photographs but it was judged not to be obscene because the purpose and the effect of the publication was seriously artistic in quality rather than designed to titillate. Distinctions between serious and not serious works has not been made in Japan, where free expression guarantees have focused almost entirely on spoken and written political expression, with literature and cinema considered “entertainment” rather than a protected form of free expression. New Wave directors, however, overtly transformed film into vehicles of political statement, raising (albeit unsuccessfully) the issue of whether censorship of those films contravened Article 21 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution. When New Wave directors like Oshima delved into topics of social commentary, prosecutors and the courts responded by focusing on censorship of specific visual images rather than provocative and controversial text/context. This response allowed the courts to draw bright lines around certain images (such as graphic nudity) without attempting any doctrinal discussion regarding the appropriate range of free expression as applied to discrete images. Id.
38 BEER, STUDY, supra note 22, at 340. Film censorship in the postwar era was conducted initially by American occupation forces with its Civil Censorship Division, primarily but not exclusively focusing on the elimination of feudal or anti-democratic content. By 1946 this role had passed to the Civil Information and Educ
ation Section (CI&E), still under occupation control, which reviewed and approved all films to be shown in public theaters. Eirin was a domestic body of film company representatives charged in 1949 with taking over regulatory responsibilities from CI&E. Id.
39 Id. at 340-45.
40 Id.
41 ANNE ALLISON, PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED DESIRES: MOTHERS, COMICS, AND CENSORSHIP IN JAPAN 164-168 (1996) [hereinafter ALLISON, DESIRES]. Given the financial investment involved in the shrinking domestic film market, producers could ill-afford the kind of protracted Eirin review or court litigation that befell Yamaguchi’s Love Hunter (Koi no karyudo) which was completed at Nikkatsu in 1972 but was denied classification for public viewing and tied up in court proceedings and not released until 1978.
42 WEISSER & WEISSER, supra note 13, at 24-26.
43 Id.; ALLISON, DESIRES, supra note 41, at 168-169.
44 WEISSER & WEISSER, supra note 13.
45 Id.
46 Id.; See BEER, STUDY, supra note 22, at 344.
47 See id.
48 WEISSER & WEISSER, supra note 13, at 28-29.
49 Mark Schilling, Yakuza Films: Fading Celluloid Heroes, 43 JAPAN. Q. 30 (1996).
50 While approximately 36% of domestic films were classified R-18 (no one under 18 admitted) by Eirin in 2001, compared to 5% of imported films, the continued production of low-budget adult films has in part been attributed to the obligation of some film producers to sustain three theater chains specializing in that fare. In the American market, theater chains specializing in X-rated fare have all but disappeared, replaced primarily by private (home) consumption via VHS and DVD formats. See id.
51 Hunter, supra note 13, at 14-25. Though it owned theaters, studios, a satellite channel, a video production company, and a library of thousands of films, Nikkatsu avoided bankruptcy in 1993 only by merging into Namco, a video game maker, and began making feature films again in 1996. Id.
52 NAGISA OSHIMA, Text of Plea, in CINEMA, CENSORSHIP AND THE STATE: THE WRITINGS OF NAGISA OSHIMA, 1956-1978 265-286 (Annette Michelson ed., 1982). See also MAUREEN TURIM, THE FILMS OF OSHIMA NAGISA: IMAGES OF A JAPANESE ICONOCLAST 125-143 (1998) [hereinafter TURIM, ICONOCLAST].
53 TURIM, ICONOCLAST, supra note 52, at 128-131. See also Leger Grindon, In the Realm of the Censors: Cultural Boundaries and the Poetics of the Forbidden, in THE WORD AND THE IMAGE IN JAPANESE CINEMA 299 (Dennis Washburn & Carole Cavanaugh eds., 2001).
54 See, e.g. DAVID DESSER, EROS PLUS MASSACRE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JAPANESE NEW WAVE CINEMA 48 (1988); KEIKO MCDONALD, CINEMA EAST: A CRITICAL STUDY OF MAJOR NEW WAVE FILMS 125-26 (1983); GREGORY BARRETT, ARCHETYPES IN JAPANESE FILM: THE SOCIOPOLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRINCIPAL HEROES AND HEROINES (1998); SATO, supra note 35, at 229-30.
55 See HUNTER, supra note 13.
56 The socio-cultural distinction between what is appropriate for public viewing (“on-scene” in theatrical terms) and what is not and should best be implied rather than shown (“off-scene”) within a society changes from period to period, and differs from society to society. See, e.g., Linda Williams, Pornographies On/scene, or Diff’rent Strokes for Diff’rent Folks, SEX EXPOSED: SEXUALITY AND THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE 234 (Lynne Segal & Mary McIntosh eds., 1993) [hereinafter Williams, Diff’rent Strokes]. As a cultural dynamic, what must/should remain “private,” i.e., not open to public scrutiny, changes with technology and expanding public appetites for information heretofore considered one’s “private business.” See, e.g., GURSTEIN, supra note 9, at 299-300.
57 OSHIMA, supra note 52, at 251-252; TURIM, ICONOCLAST, supra note 52, at 125-128; Grindon, supra note 53, at 294-295.
58 See Downs, supra note 33.
59 The threshold of female nudity in Japanese film was actually crossed in the mid-1950s with young women portrayed as either nude pearl divers or “jungle women,” both arguably in their “natural” element. Frontal female nudity and intimate nude embraces became common fare from 1957 into the pinku eiga period of the 1960s and was characteristic in a variety of forms in the development of the highly successful gangster, grotesque horror, and sadomasochistic film genres.
60 See, e.g., Oshima’s Violence at Noon (Hakuchi no torima 1966), Masahiro Shonda’s Double Suicide (Shinju ten no Amijima 1969), Koji Wakamatsu’s Go, Go Second Time Virgin (Yuke, Yuke—Nidome No Shojo 1969).
61 See IAN BURUMA, BEHIND THE MASK: ON SEXUAL DEMONS, SACRED MOTHERS, TRANSVESTITES, GANGSTERS AND OTHER JAPANESE CULTURAL HEROES 47-63 (1984); Grindon, supra note 53, at 304-310.
62 See Stephen Heath, The Question Oshima, 2 WIDE ANGLE 48 (1977).
63 This was the position taken by the court in the de Sade case. See de Sade case, supra note 27.
64 Such arousal depends on the ability of the producer/director to frame a construct of images familiar enough to the audience to evoke the desired response. BERKELEY KAITE, PORNOGRAPHY AND DIFFERENCE (1995); CONSTANCE PENLEY, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION: FILM, FEMINISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 83 (1989); Stephen Prince, The Pornographic Image and Practice of Film Theory, 27 CINEMA J. 27-28 (1988); Stephen Heath, Difference, 19 SCREEN 51 (1978). And while it may be within the power of a director to control the framing of such images, what is beyond the director’s control is the degree to which the audience responds (and responds uniformly) in a predictable manner. See, e.g., Williams, Diff’rent Strokes, supra note 56, at 240-43.
65 In this sense, pornography has become a craft of orchestrating and manipulating the frame of reference or construct, providing the audience with familiar motifs that allow easy interpretation of imagery. The same is true of horror and sadomasochistic films, genres with significant overlap between American and Japanese markets in film, anime, and adult manga. See, e.g., Sharon Kinsella, ADULT MANGA: CULTURE AND POWER IN CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE SOCIETY 44-49 (2000). The ideological and societal implications of pornographic framing, not only with regard to the widely debated perspective that pornography reinforces the systematic societal degradation of women, continue to be argued. See MACKINNON, supra note 11. See also Simon Hardy, Feminist Iconoclasm and the Problem of Eroticism, 3 SEXUALITIES 77 (2000) (probing the question of whether there can be a distinct “feminist pornography”). Ironically, Oshima enveloped his explicit sex scenes in a counter-construct—sadomasochism—that would deny the “mainstream” audience the expected frame of reference for pornographic films. However, the more fundamental question may be whether pornography equally addresses “intended” and “unintended” audiences based on their respective adopted gender roles (the social construct having little meaning to or effect upon “unintended” audiences) or even their socioeconomic class (as a measure of their willingness to “transgress” traditional social norms of behavior and taste). See Linda Williams, Second Thoughts on Hard Core: American Obscenity Law and the Scapegoating of Deviance, in DIRTY LOOKS: WOMEN, PORNOGRAPHY, POWER 46 (Pamela Church Gibson & Roma Gibson eds., 1994); Rebecca Huntley, Slippery When Wet: The Shifting Boundaries of the Pornographic (A Class Analysis), 12 CONTINUUM 69 (1998).
66 See, e.g. TURIM, ICONOCLAST, supra note 52, at 246-265; JOAN MELLEN, THE WAVES AT GENJI’S DOOR: JAPAN THROUGH ITS CINEMA 353-370 (1976).
67 AUDIE BOCK, JAPANESE FILM DIRECTORS 309-337 (1985); SATO, supra note 35, at 233; and Abramson & Hayashi, supra note 19, at 178-179.
68 ALLISON, DESIRES, supra note 41, at 153-55.
69 Throughout the pinku eiga period and pervasive by the 1980s, entertainment media in Japan have focused almost obsessively on young girls in advertising, photobooks, manga, anime, and film. This peculiar vulnerability of young girls (as opposed to adult women) to sexually exploitive portrayals reveals ambivalent societal expectations of innocent young girls, who are not yet considered by social expectation to possess adult sensuality and not yet occupying responsible or valued social roles. Such portrayals perpetuate and invite fixation upon the pre-adolescent image of young women. Sharon Kinsella, Cuties in Japan, in WOMEN, MEDIA AND CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN 220 (Lise Skov & Brian Moeran eds., 2000) and BURUMA, supra note 61. As modern consumer culture reinforces the pre-adolescent roles of young women in Japan, it also seems to suspend any societal responsibility for insulating them from being portrayed as victims of violence and sexual exploitation in entertainment media. Allison, Cutting, supra note 34; Rosemary Iwamura, Letter from Japan: From Girls Who Dress Up Like Boys to Trussed-up Porn Stars—Some of the Contemporary Heroines on the Japanese Screen, 7 CONTINUUM 109 (1994); and Susan Napier, The Frenzy of Metamorphosis: The Body in Japanese Pornographic Animation, in WORD AND IMAGE IN JAPANESE CINEMA 345-356 (Dennis Washburn & Carole Cavanaugh eds., 2001).
70 To a certain degree, then, a photograph or a painting has the disadvantage of no surrounding context (developed scene, dialogue, musical score, etc.) from which the audience might draw ambience or reinforcement, and places greater responsibility on the audience to provide the construct. Aware of this, producers of pornographic photographs use standardized motifs in presenting their images, motifs with which members of the (intended) audience are already familiar and can readily provide context. When still photos are extracted from a film, however, as they were from the Oshima film for reproduction in the book, they lack the “proper staging” characteristic of commercially-produced pornographic photographs or images. That pornography relies on either proper film context or familiar “staging” in still photography presents a dilemma for those who wish to equate pornography with the explicitness of images. When images are viewed outside of a pornographic (sexual) context, there is serious doubt whether the intent of the producer is to provide sexual stimulation, the defining element of pornography, and/or whether sexual stimulation (of those in the audience) is actually produced. This predicament presents itself in a wide spectrum of circumstances: from nudity presented in classical poses (as in classical paintings or photographic poses) or in “natural” settings. The issue is further stretched when young girls, assumed to not yet possess adult sensuality (as discussed in supra note 69), are portrayed in “natural” nude poses for clearly sexually exploitive purposes, even with assurances that the models are over eighteen years of age. See, e.g., ANNE HIGONNET, PICTURES OF INNOCENCE: THE HISTORY AND CRISIS OF IDEAL CHILDHOOD 195-96 (1998) and in particular the controversy surrounding Sally Mann’s photographic work Immediate Family. Id. at 202-03.
71 This was in fact the basis of the court’s ruling in the de Sade case. The Court reasoned that while the writings of de Sade were offensive to the average man’s sense of modesty and in opposition to proper concepts of sexual morality, they did not (effectively) appeal to sexual passion and therefore could not be considered obscene under Article 175. See the de Sade case, supra note 27. The absence of erotic qualities is often interpreted as a situation of unresolved difference by creating a contradictory construction rather than a matter of explicitness of image. Constructions outside the expected could then be ruled pornographic (explicit) without being erotic (having the effect of appeal to sexual passion). Without erotic effect, however, pornography tends to be reduced to gratuitous graphicness or the grotesque.
72 The appearance in Japanese theater of the handsome, kind and gentle, sympathetic second leading man (ninaime), directionless and without dignity, yet capable of showing emotion and often falling in love with the unfortunate woman spurned by the noble but indifferent main lead (tateyaku), became a staple of the Shimpa-style love tragedies characteristic of Japanese theater 1900-1920 and in Nikkatsu films in the 1930s, often leading to double-suicide. See generally SATO, supra note 35, at 15-56 (discussing the evolution of standard types of roles in Japanese film); BARRETT, supra note 54, at 118-140. The amalgamation of this traditional role into chivalric films (ninkyo eiga) and ultimately into the “good gangster” (yakuza) films that dominated the Japanese market in the 1960s and early 1970s was the staple of the Toei and Nikkatsu Studios.
73 TURIM, ICONOCLAST, supra note 52, at 137-140; BURUMA, supra note 61, at 47-63. There is certainly room for psychoanalytical debate over the nature of Sada’s allure. Her allure was portrayed initially as Kichi’s fascination with the youthful perfection of her skin but perhaps it is ultimately reduced to his failed attempt to capture/recapture the fleetingness of his own youth. This fatalistic interpretation is reinforced by the fact that Kichi has numerous confrontations with images of old age and death throughout the film. However, utilizing a different psychoanalytic construct, one might interpret Kichi as the protagonist (rather than Sada), that it is he who seeks consummate liberation and through his sacrificial death finds it, leaving Sada behind, incomplete, unfulfilled, and lost in the real world.
74 Likewise there is room for psychoanalytical debate over whether the last scene, where Sada severs Kichi’s penis with a large knife and holds it in her hand, is necessary or gratuitous. Clearly Oshima has introduced the audience to sharp instruments (Kichi’s razor, and first a smaller and then later a very large knife) as weapons of both violence and control throughout the film. For example, on a number of occasions, Sada threatens to cut off Kichi’s penis if he copulates with his wife again. If the audience has already acknowledged this construct, witnessing the actual severing might be seen as unnecessary and done gratuitously—for shock value. However, if the construct is accepted on a more metaphorical level by the audience, the debate would focus more on questions of fetish--Kichi having fetishized her satisfaction and Sada having fetishized his penis (as opposed to phallus)--and which of those constructs has become dominant by the final scene. Finally, the construct could be interpreted in Lacanian terms, with Sada and Kichi repeatedly striving for idealized sexual complimentarity and he ultimately achieving a singular sense of purity by sacrificing his own being (his “gift”) to her satisfaction—leaving her ultimately alone (with a “keepsake”). See Peter Lehman, In the Realm of the Senses: Desire, Power, and the Representation of the Male Body, 2 GENDERS 91 (1988). This construct focuses audience attention on whether there exists a metaphorical competition between Kichi (who has a penis and therefore has status in society) and Sada (who “lacks” but strives to “have” control as an expression of her aspiration to status or power). The audience is also left grappling with the question of whether the phallus is such an integral and independent element in a society that two people could compete over it or could, metaphysically, share it. Under either analysis, the final scene in which the penis is severed has important contextual meaning and is not simply gratuitous. See, e.g., Barbara Creed, Horror and the Monstrous Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection, THE DREAD OF DIFFERENCE, GENDER AND THE HORROR FILM 35 (Barry Keith Grant, ed., 1996).
75 CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 15.
76 OSHIMA, supra note 52, at 268-279.
77 The difficulty in gauging the effectiveness of pornography in stimulating sexual interest in the audience is that we cannot presume the members in the audience are uniformly comfortable with or responsive to a single construct of pornographic framing. See Sharon Kinsella, supra note 65. If members of the audience are using multiple, or even contrary frames of reference, the pertinent question becomes whether some in the audience will respond in a prurient fashion to the presented construct while others will be indifferent or even hostile to that construct. This raises the fundamental issue of whether a society is warranted in regulating expression for all when its (undesired) effect is only on some. See Calvert, supra note 8; KAITE, supra note 64.
78 Applications of obscenity law in the United States are founded on the assumption that there exists a societal consensus on civility, with appeals to common sense and the values of the “average person,” and little political or legal debate as to what that core of civility might be or should be. See Calvert, supra note 8. That judgment is currently left to juries (rather than judges) to apply “local community standards” in deciding whether materials are obscene, under the assumption that sexually violent behavior is a manifestation of the breakdown of that social consensus, the lack of a sense of public decency and decorum, and the absence of a sense of civility. For this reason, the dominant rationale for regulating obscenity in the United States is not to protect an established and consensual sense of public decorum as in Japan, but rather to prevent what is feared will be the subsequent anti-social behavior.
79 See generally Kawashima, supra note 21


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